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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we analyze the interaction between intelligent and selfish
agents in non-cooperative environments with a specific focus on the trans-
mission of some private information among them. We seek to quantify the
ability of informed agents to shape the uninformed (rational) agents’ be-
liefs about the private information through signals crafted strategically even
when the uninformed agents construct their beliefs with awareness of how
the messages were crafted. Through the quantification of this ability, our
goal is to introduce strategic information transmission to applications in cy-
ber and cyber-physical systems as a deception-as-defense mode of operation.
It is worth noting that transparency in the signals sent provides robustness
against advanced adversaries that can learn/discover the signaling strategy.
Due to the versatility of the Gaussian distribution, we first formulate deriva-
tion of the optimal signaling strategies for Gauss Markov information in dy-
namic communication settings. We formulate an equivalent semi-definite pro-
gram instead of addressing this problem over the original infinite-dimensional
strategy spaces. We show that the optimal signaling strategies are linear
within the general class of measurable policies when the agents have dif-
ferent quadratic cost measures. This formulation brings in the possibility
of adopting strategic information transmission in dynamic control systems
based on the common theme of communication and control settings. In this
context, we introduce a robust sensor design framework and compute the
associated sensor outputs to provide resiliency in linear-quadratic-Gaussian
control systems against advanced attackers with malicious and unknown con-
trol objectives. In order to extend these results to distributions other than
Gaussian, we have address the problem of optimal hierarchical signaling for
a general class of square integrable multivariate distributions. Again instead
of addressing the problem directly over the original strategy spaces, we have
formulated an equivalent linear optimization problem over the cone of com-
ii
pletely positive matrices when the underlying state space is finite. The ability
to compute the optimal signaling strategies for large finite state spaces en-
ables us to address the signaling problem approximately also for continuous
distributions. We also provide analytical guarantees on the level of accu-
racy for the approximation. Finally, we discuss some of the future research
directions on belief shaping through strategic signaling.
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The triumph of persuasion over force is the sign of a civilized soci-
ety.
– Mark Skousen
Around five centuries ago, discovery of ignorance, i.e., believing that no
one can know everything that is important, was a breaking point for scientific
research, and as a result today’s technological wisdom has arisen [1]. There is
always an entire world of important information to be discovered. However,
only some could have access to (or discover) new important information,
e.g., based on their effort, while there will be others who would desperately
need this information in order to improve their decisions. Axiomatically,
there will always be someone who knows what we do not know (yet relevant
to important for us), and vice versa. This inevitable distributed nature of
information and its substantial importance can lead to manipulation of the
decisions by the information providers.
Human history is full of such manipulations: Authorities holding the will
of certain ideologies or religions (we can consider them as the information
providers) could have controlled masses even to the extent of wasting their
own lives willingly [1]. The key distinction is the willingness in their actions
rather than them being controlled by force since the masses had perceived the
engineered phenomenon as the absolute truth by heart. However, the issue is
still not over in today’s world. Indeed, it is far more prevailing because of the
tremendous amount of information that is available out there, and the world
is as tightly networked as ever. Some scholars even view today as the era of
big data [2]. And we are developing trust in the power of informed decisions
more and more as we are always observing its repeatedly proven empirical
effectiveness. However, this trust makes the informed decisions vulnerable








Figure 1.1: The interaction between an information provider and a decision
maker through explicit or implicit signal(s) while the information and the
decision are valuable to both.
There are various definitions of deception. Depending on the specific defi-
nition at hand, the analysis or the related applications vary.
Definition. We say that an informed agent (or the signal the agent crafts) is
deceptive if he/she shapes that information of interest private to him/her
strategically in order to control the perception of the uninformed agents
toward his/her own benefit by removing, changing, or adding content.
Indeed, our ability to infer information from correlated phenomena enables
us to generalize this signaling model to settings where there is no explicit
signaling or physical messages, but we can still infer certain information
based on observed actions.
Definition. We say that an action taker (or the associated action) is decep-
tive if he/she takes the actions strategically to control the others’ inference
about information of interest private to him/her in the direction of his/her
own benefit.
In either case, the information should have value for both sides so that the
informed agent could deceive the other agent(s), and the decisions should
be valuable to both sides so that the informed agent could have incentive to
manipulate the decisions. Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of the strategic
information flow between informed and uninformed agents.
In noncooperative environments with asymmetry of information, the inter-
action between informed and uninformed agents can turn into a game where
the agents select their strategies according to their selfish objectives while
taking into account the fact that the other agent would also have selected
his/her strategy1 according to his/her selfish, possibly different, objective.
1We use the terms “strategy”, “policy”, and “signaling/decision rule” interchangeably.
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Correspondingly, such an interaction between the informed and uninformed
agents can be analyzed under a game-theoretic solution concept. Note that
there is a main distinction between incentive compatible deception model
and deception model with policy commitment.
Definition. We say that a deception model is incentive compatible if nei-
ther the informed nor the uninformed agent(s) have any incentive to deviate
from their strategies unilaterally.
The associated solution concept here is the Nash equilibrium [3]. Exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in general. Furthermore, even
if it exists, there may be multiple Nash equilibria. Without certain commit-
ments, none of the equilibria may actually be realized or in case one has been
realized, it is not a priori certain as to which of the multiple equilibria was
the one realized, since different ones could be favorable to different players.
Definition. We say that in a deception model, there is policy commitment
if either the informed agent or the uninformed agent commits to play a
certain strategy beforehand and the other agent reacts to it, being aware of
the committed strategy.
The associated solution concept is the Stackelberg equilibrium, where one
of the players leads the game by announcing his/her committed strategy [3].
Existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium is not guaranteed in general, e.g., over
non-compact strategy spaces. However, if it exists, all the equilibria would
lead to the same game outcome for the leader of the game since the leader
could have always selected the favorable one among them. We also note that
if there is a favorable outcome for the leader in the incentive compatible
model, the leader has the freedom to commit to that policy in the latter
model. Correspondingly, the leader would be at an advantage by acting first
to commit to play according to a certain strategy even though the result may
not be incentive compatible.
Game theoretical analysis of deception has attracted substantial interest in
various disciplines, including economics and engineering fields. In the follow-
ing subsections, we review the literature in these disciplines with respect to
deception models involving incentive compatibility and policy commitment.
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1.1 Economics Literature
The scheme of the type introduced above, called strategic information trans-
mission, was introduced in a seminal paper [4] by V. Crawford and J. Sobel.
This paper has attracted substantial attention due to the wide range of rel-
evant applications from economics and political science to philosophy and
biology. J. Sobel surveys these applications across various disciplines in [5].
In the model adopted in [4], there are two agents, and the informed agent’s
objective function includes a commonly known (deterministic) bias term dif-
ferent from the uninformed agent’s objective. That bias term can be viewed
as the misalignment factor in-between the two objectives. For the incentive
compatible model, the authors have shown that all equilibria are partition
equilibria, where the informed agent controls the resolution of the information
shared via certain quantization schemes, under certain assumptions on the
objective functions (satisfied by quadratic objectives), and the assumption
that the information of interest is drawn from a distribution with bounded
support.
Following this inaugural introduction of the strategic information trans-
mission framework, also called cheap talk due to the costless communication
over an ideal channel, different settings, have been studied extensively such
as
 Single sender and multiple receivers [6, 7]
 Multiple senders and single receiver [8–10]
 Repeated games [11]
 Multidimensional information [10]
 Unbounded state and lying cost [12]
 Certifiable information [13]
 Dynamic information transmission over finite horizon [14]
Different from the original setting in [4], some of these settings, e.g., [10,12–
14], could lead to full revelation of the information at an equilibrium. In [10],
the author has shown that when there are multiple senders, the receiver could
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exploit the aligned part of different senders to recover the underlying infor-
mation fully. Similarly, when the state is multidimensional, the receiver can
ensure that even a single sender shares the information truthfully at certain
dimensions in an equilibrium [10]. Furthermore, truthful information revela-
tion could also be observed at an equilibrium when the sender faces a cost
of lying, which can grow unboundedly as shown in [12]; when the certifi-
able information makes the messages state-contingent as shown in [13]; and
when the dynamic interactions of the players align their incentives together
as shown in [14].
More recently, in [15], the authors have proposed to use a deception model
with policy commitment, called “Bayesian persuasion”. Different from the
setting in [4], here the sender cannot distort or conceal information once
the signal realization is known, which can be viewed as the sender revealing
and committing to the signaling rule in addition to the corresponding signal
realization. For information of interest drawn from a compact metric space,
the authors have provided necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a strategic signal that can benefit the informed agent, and characterized the
corresponding optimal signaling rule through a geometrical interpretation.
Following the introduction of Bayesian persuasion, the problem has been
analyzed under various settings, such as
 Multiple senders and single receiver [16,17]
 Single sender and multiple receivers [18]
 Dynamic environments [19]
 Costly persuasion [20]
A detailed review of these studies could be found in the survey [21]. Further-
more, in [22], the author has shown the optimality of linear signaling rules for
multivariate Gaussian information of interest and with quadratic objective
functions.
1.2 Engineering Literature
There exist various engineering applications depending on the definition of
deception. Reference [23] provides a taxonomy of these studies with a spe-
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cific focus on security. Obfuscation techniques to hide valuable information,
e.g., via externally introduced noise [24–26] can also be viewed as deception
based defense. As an example, in [24], the authors have provided a browser
extension that can obfuscate a user’s real queries by including automatically
fabricated queries to preserve privacy. Here, however, we specifically focus
on signaling-based deception applications, in which we craft the information
available to adversaries to control their perception rather than corrupting it.
In line with the browser extension example, our goal is to persuade the query
trackers to perceive the user behavior in a certain fabricated way rather than
limiting their ability to learn the actual user behavior.
In computer security, various (heuristic) deception techniques, e.g., honey-
pots and honey nets, are prevalent to make the adversary perceive a honey-
system as the real one or a real system as a honey-one [27]. Several studies,
e.g., [28], have analyzed honeypots within the framework of binary signaling
games by abstracting the complexity of crafting a real system to be perceived
as a honeypot (or crafting a honeypot to be perceived as a real system) to
binary signals. However, here, our goal is to address the optimal way to
craft the underlying information of interest with a continuum support, e.g.,
a Gaussian state.
The recent study [29] addresses strategic information transmission of mul-
tivariate Gaussian information over an additive Gaussian noise channel for
quadratic misaligned cost functions and identifies the conditions where the
signaling rule attaining a Nash equilibrium can be a linear function. Recall
that for the scalar case, when there is no noisy channel in-between, all the
equilibria are partition equilibria, implying that all the signaling rules attain-
ing a Nash equilibrium are nonlinear except babbling equilibrium, where the
informed agent discloses no information [4]. Two other recent studies [30]
and [31] address strategic information transmission for the scenarios where
the bias term is not common knowledge of the players and the solution con-
cept is Stackelberg equilibrium rather than Nash equilibrium. They have
shown that the Stackelberg equilibrium could be attained by linear signal-
ing rules under certain conditions, different from the partition equilibria in
the incentive compatible cheap talk model [4]. In [31], the authors have
studied strategic sensor networks for multivariate Gaussian information of
interest and with myopic quadratic objective functions in dynamic environ-
ments and by restricting the receiver’s strategies to affine functions. In [30],
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for jointly Gaussian scalar private information and bias variable, the authors
have shown that optimal sender strategies are linear functions within the
general class of measurable policies for misaligned quadratic cost functions
when there is an additive Gaussian noise channel and hard power constraint
on the signal, i.e., when it is no longer cheap talk.
Although strategic signaling has attracted significant attention in vari-
ous fields due to its compelling applications in noncooperative multi-agent
environments, we still have important but not yet explored problems. In
this dissertation, we seek to address some of these issues within the theme
of deception and security with a specific application point of view in cy-
ber and cyber-physical systems. We specifically seek to introduce strategic
information transmission to cyber or cyber-physical systems as a deception-
as-defense mode of operation, explained below. Particularly, strategic infor-
mation transmission can play a key role in multi-agent non-cooperative envi-
ronments as well as in cooperative ones, where certain (uninformed) agents
could have been compromised by certain adversaries. In such scenarios, in-
formed agents can signal strategically to the uninformed ones in case they
could have been compromised. Furthermore, deceiving an adversary to act,
or attack the system in a way aligned with the system’s goals can be viewed
as being too optimistic due to the very definition of adversary. However, an
adversary can also be viewed as a selfish decision maker seeking to satisfy
a certain malicious objective, which may not necessarily be completely con-
flicting with the system’s objective. This now leads to the following notion
of “deception-as-defense”.
Definition. We say that an informed agent engages in a deception-as-
defense mode of operation if he/she crafts the information of interest strate-
gically before sharing with an uninformed (malicious) agent in order to per-
suade him/her (without any explicit enforcement) to act in line with the
aligned part of the objective as much as possible without taking into account
the misaligned part.
We re-emphasize that this approach differs from the approaches that seek
to raise suspicion on the information of interest to sabotage the adversaries’
malicious objectives. Sabotaging the adversaries’ malicious objectives may
not necessarily be the best option for the informed agent unless the objectives
are completely opposite of each other. In this latter case, the deception-
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as-defense framework actually ends up seeking to sabotage the adversaries’
malicious objectives.
We also note that this approach differs from lying, i.e., the scenario where
the informed agent provides totally different information (correlated or not)
as if it is the information of interest. Lying could be effective, as expected,
as long as the uninformed agent trusts the legitimacy of the information
provided. However, in non-cooperative environments, this could turn into a
game where the uninformed agent becomes aware of the possibility of lying.
This correspondingly raises suspicion on the legitimacy of the shared infor-
mation and could end up sabotaging the adversaries’ malicious objectives
rather than controlling their perception of the information of interest.
Once a defense mechanism has been widely deployed, this can cause the
advanced adversaries to learn the defense policy in the course of time. Cor-
respondingly, the solution concept of policy commitment model can address
this possibility in the deception-as-defense framework in a robust way if the
defender commits to a certain policy that takes into account the best re-
action of the adversaries that are aware of the policy. Furthermore, the
transparency of the signal sent via the committed policy generates a trust-
based relationship in-between the sender and the receiver, which is powerful
to persuade the receiver to make certain decisions inadvertently without any
explicit enforcement by the sender. Therefore, we focus on deception mod-
els with policy commitment. We call it hierarchical signaling in order to
distinguish it from the general setting of strategic information transmission.
Due to the versatility of the Gaussian distribution in engineering appli-
cations, we mostly address (multivariate) Gaussian signaling under various
scenarios:
 Dynamic environments over finite or infinite horizon [32–36]
 Noisy environments [37,38]
 Linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control [34, 38–41]
 Single sender and multiple receivers [38]
Reference [42] provides an overview of these results. Furthermore, we have
also addressed the problem of optimal hierarchical signaling for a general
class of distributions in [43] under static settings, and in [36] under dynamic
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settings with, however, the receiver restricted to using linear estimates. In
this dissertation, we provide an overview of these contributions with a specific
focus on dynamic Gaussian signaling, robust sensor design, and signaling for
general distributions.
1.3 Dynamic Gaussian Signaling
In [22], the author has shown the optimality of linear signaling strategies
within the general class of measurable policies in an analytical form for mul-
tivariate Gaussian distributions over a single-stage information flow. Its ex-
tension to multi-stage information flow necessitates balancing the trade-off
between deceiving at a current stage and preserving the capacity to deceive
at future stages when the receiver has perfect recall. Furthermore, such an
extension could bring the strategic information transmission into the frame-
work of dynamic control systems. To this end, we seek to address dynamic
Gaussian signaling under various scenarios, including signaling over finite or
infinite horizon, signaling of degenerate Gaussian information, and signaling
with noisy or partial measurements.
Over a finite horizon, for a discrete-time Gauss-Markov process, and when
the sender and the receiver have misaligned quadratic objectives, in [34], we
have shown the optimality of linear signaling rules within the general class of
measurable policies and provided a semi-definite program (SDP) to compute
the optimal policies numerically. Also in [34], we have formulated the opti-
mal linear signaling rule in a non-cooperative LQG control setting when the
sensor and the controller have known misaligned control objectives. In [35],
we have shown the optimality of linear signaling in the settings where the un-
derlying Gaussian distribution is degenerate. Furthermore, in [36], we have
shown that there exists a solution if the players have discounted quadratic
cost measures over infinite horizon and formulated the linear signaling rules
that can lead to optimal performance for the sender approximately with any
desired level of accuracy. For Gaussian information, under the restriction
that the sender can use linear-plus-noise signaling strategies only, we have
also formulated the optimal signaling strategies in the settings where there
exists an additive Gaussian noise channel [37] and the sender has access to
a noisy version of the underlying information [38].
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1.4 Robust Sensor Design
As a deception-as-defense mode of operation in cyber-physical systems, we
seek to restrain the actions of the attackers (with control objectives) by
controlling their perceptions about the underlying state. To this end, we
can use the asymmetry of information in favor of resiliency, and design the
sensor outputs strategically against the possibility of undetected attacks on
the system. In [39] and in the ensuing studies [40, 41], we have introduced
the secure sensor design framework, where we have addressed the optimal
linear signaling rule again in a non-cooperative LQG setting when the sensor
and private-type controller have misaligned control objectives in a Bayesian
setting, i.e., the distribution over the private type of the controller is known.
In [38], we have addressed optimal linear robust signaling in a non-Bayesian
setting, where the distribution over the private type of the controller is not
known, and provided a comprehensive formulation by considering also the
cases where the sensor could have partial or noisy information on the signal
of interest and relevance.
1.5 Signaling for General Distributions
Within the hierarchical signaling framework, optimal signaling strategy has
been formulated in [22] for Gaussian distributions. In [15], the authors have
developed a geometrical interpretation to address the problem for distribu-
tions over finite state spaces with fairly small sizes. For larger state spaces,
they have characterized the specific settings where we can deduce whether
the sender can benefit via strategic signaling or not. However, its computa-
tion for general settings, e.g., for relatively large state spaces, has remained
open. Therefore, in this dissertation, we have sought to address the problem
of optimal hierarchical signaling for a general class of multivariate square
integrable distributions.
In [36], we have shown that all the results obtained for Gaussian, e.g.,
optimality of linear signaling within the general class of measurable policies,
hold also for distributions other than Gaussian if the receiver has bounded
rationality by using linear estimates only. However, if the receiver is (un-
boundedly) rational, the problem is much more challenging. To address it,
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in [43], we have first addressed the problem for finite state spaces by formu-
lating an equivalent linear optimization problem over the cone of completely
positive matrices. Even though the equivalent problem and its dual turn
out to be not tractable because of the difficulty the convex cones present,
the equivalence established has enabled us to use the existing computational
tools to solve this class of cone programs approximately with any desired
level of accuracy. Furthermore, for continuous distributions, we have ob-
tained theoretical guarantees on the approximation level of the proposed
solution concept when it is applied to a discretized version of the underlying
information, e.g., through a given quantization scheme.
1.6 Organization
We organize the dissertation as follows. In Chapter 2, we analyze how a
deceptive information provider can shape Gauss-Markov information in or-
der to control a decision maker’s perception in dynamic environments. In
Chapter 3, we introduce a deception-as-defense mode of operation for linear-
quadratic-Gaussian systems, to enhance their resiliency against multiple at-
tackers with misaligned control objectives. In Chapter 4, we address the
problem of optimal hierarchical signaling for a general class of distributions.
Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of the dissertation and discusses
future research directions in the topical areas covered by the dissertation.
Appendices A-C provide technical proofs for Chapters 2-4.
1.7 Notation
For an ordered set of parameters, e.g., x1, . . . , xn, we define xk∶l ∶= xk, . . . , xl,
where 1 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ n. For a vector x and a matrix A, x′ and A′ denote their
transposes; further ∥x∥ and ∥A∥2 denote the Euclidean (L2) norms of the
vector x and the matrix A, respectively. For a matrix A, Tr{A} denotes
its trace. We denote the identity and zero matrices with the associated
dimensions by I and O, respectively. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product
of the matrices A and B.
For positive semi-definite matrices A and B, A ⪰ B means that A−B is also
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a positive semi-definite matrix. Sm (or Sm+ ) denotes the set of symmetric (or
positive semi-definite) matrices of dimensions m-by-m while Rn×m+ (or Rn×m++ )
denotes the set of n-by-m matrices with non-negative (or positive) entries.
We denote random variables by bold lowercase letters, e.g., x. For a ran-
dom variable x, x̂ is another random variable corresponding to its posterior
belief conditioned on certain random variables that will be apparent from
the context. For a random vector, e.g., x, cov{x} denotes the corresponding
covariance matrix. N (0, .) denotes the multivariate Gaussian distribution




Half a truth is often a great lie.
– Benjamin Franklin
In1 the era of smart devices, we have various systems having enhanced
processing and efficient communication capabilities. Even though informa-
tion exchange is generally useful in cooperative multi-agent networks, where
each agent has the same goal, such as in consensus networks, diversification
in smart systems brings about inevitable mismatches in the objectives of
different agents. This then leads to noncooperative game formulations for
smart systems in the disclosure of information [4,22,30,44]. As an example,
a trajectory controller can drive a tracking system to a desired path, different
from the tracker’s actual intent, by controlling the disclosed information [33].
To this end, consider the scenario of a sender (PS) having access to some
information and a receiver (PR) needing this information to be able to take
a particular action, impacting both PS and PR. In the classical communica-
tion setting, PS seeks to transmit this information in the best possible way,
leading to a full cooperation between him/her and PR, toward mitigating the
channel’s impact on the transmitted signals. However, even if there exists an
ideal (perfect) channel between PS and PR, if their objectives differ, abso-
lute transparency of the disclosed information is not a reasonable action for
PS in general [4, 22, 30, 44]. In a hierarchical game, also known as Stackel-
berg game, [3], PR reacts after PS’s disclosure of information. Therefore, in
strategic settings, where objectives differ, PS develops strategies to control
the transparency of the disclosed information. Originally, a scheme of this
type, called strategic information transmission, was introduced in a seminal
paper by V. Crawford and J. Sobel [4], and attracted substantial attention in
1We acknowledge that the content of this chapter appears in [34] and the copyright
owner has provided permission for reprint.
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the economics and engineering literatures due to the wide range of relevant
applications.
Recently, strategic information transmission in hierarchical signaling games
(where there is a hierarchy in the announcement of the strategies) has at-
tracted substantial interest in various disciplines, including control theory
[31, 33, 45], information theory [30, 46], and economics [15, 22]. In [31], the
authors have studied strategic sensor networks for Gaussian variables and
with myopic quadratic objective functions, i.e., the players construct strate-
gies just for the current stage irrespective of the length of the horizon, by
restricting the receiver strategies to affine functions. Reference [33] has ad-
dressed the optimality of linear sender strategies within the general class of
policies for myopic quadratic objectives. In [29, 45], the authors have shown
that for scalar parameters, quadratic cost functions, and a commonly known
bias parameter, the hierarchical game formulation can be converted into a
team problem. Reference [30] has shown that linear sender strategies achieve
the equilibrium within the general class of policies even with additive Gaus-
sian noise channels. In [22], the author has demonstrated the optimality of
linear sender strategies also for the multivariate Gaussian information, and
with quadratic cost functions. In [15], the authors have provided a geometri-
cal interpretation of the optimal signaling strategies for general information
parameters.
In addition to the mismatched objectives in a communication system,
the signaling game setting can also be considered as a dynamic deception
game [47–49], where a player aims to deceive the other player, say vic-
tim, such that the victim’s perception about an underlying phenomenon
and correspondingly the victim’s reaction is controlled in a desirable way.
Hence, this approach brings about new security and resilience applications
for cyber-physical systems that are vulnerable to cyber attacks, e.g., power
grids, transportation systems, and cloud networks [50–52]. In particular,
turning the problem around, new defense mechanisms can be developed aim-
ing to arouse attackers’ suspicion on compromised information or to deceive
attackers to take certain actions. Additionally, the resulting scheme would
be advantageous to the defender, i.e., sender in the strategic communication
scheme, in terms of his/her objectives due to the hierarchical structure, and
therefore would be more preferable for security related scenarios.
A recent Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) [53] shows that
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millions of people have been affected by and a substantial amount of financial
loss has occurred due to cyber attacks. Furthermore, many of the attacks are
either unreported or not yet discovered by the victim. Importantly, in 93%
of the attacks, the attackers can infiltrate into the system within minutes
and even seconds, and in 68% of the attacks the attackers exfiltrate the
system within days [53]. Therefore, if attackers succeed in infiltrating into
the system, an additional layer of defense based on dynamic deception can
play a vital role for the security of the system [54]. The experiment conducted
in blue (defender) and red (attacker) teams from Lockheed Martin [55] is an
illustrative example of the effectiveness of deception strategies even when the
confidential information has been compromised.
Now, coming to the specifics of this chapter, we obtain here equilibrium
achieving sender strategies in hierarchical (i.e., Stackelberg [3]) multi-stage
signaling games with finite horizon, where hierarchically PS is the leader such
that his/her strategies are known by (and enforced on) PR. We show that
memoryless linear sender strategies and linear receiver strategies can yield
multi-stage equilibrium with finite horizon for general quadratic objective
functions and multivariate Gaussian processes evolving according to first-
order auto-regressive models. This extends the result for the optimality of
linear strategies shown in [22] to dynamic settings. We point out that in
the dynamic settings, in addition to the mismatches between the objectives,
PS should also control the transparency of the disclosed information due to
impact of the actions on future stages. At each stage, PS faces a trade-off
in terms of the current stage and all other future stages of the game while
controlling the transparency of the disclosed information, and should develop
strategies in a comprehensive manner over the horizon.
After obtaining equilibrium achieving policies in the multi-stage strate-
gic communication game, we extend the results to noncooperative strategic
control, where sensor and controller of a dynamic system have different ob-
jectives. As an example, the controller aims to drive the system to a desired
path based on the sensor outputs, while the sensor designs the sensor out-
puts to deceive the controller so that the system is driven to a path different
from the controller’s actual intent. Such a scheme can have important ap-
plications in resilience of cyber-physical systems under adversarial attacks.
Even though attackers have infiltrated into the controller and gained access
to control the system, the damage could be minimized via the strategic sen-
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sor outputs. Furthermore, the sensors of the system could also be infiltrated
into by the attackers, which can annihilate the proposed defense mechanism
via a shortcut to the state realization if the sensors’s policies could be con-
trolled remotely. In order to mitigate that, we consider the scenario where
the sensor’s signaling rules are selected beforehand to minimize the expected
loss and fixed (can be time-variant, yet not controlled) during the operation.
We provide an algorithm to compute the optimal linear sensor signaling rules
for Gauss-Markov processes controlled by the controller with any measurable
control rule2 numerically with global optimality guarantees.
Particularly, the proposed formulation can be considered as a passive de-
fense strategy that can be incorporated along with active defense strate-
gies [54]. Consider the scenarios, where infiltration detection mechanisms
(an active defense mechanism) have detected adversarial infiltration into the
controller of the cyber-physical system and characterized the control objec-
tive of the adversary. And there is certain necessary time before disabling
the access of the attacker to the controller. For that time interval, which
can be considered as the time horizon in our formulation, the system can
switch to the proposed passive defense mode, where the sensor outputs have
been constructed to minimize the damage due to the attack. We empha-
size that no information will be shared with the attacker except the sensor’s
outputs (which can also be non-informative). Importantly, the defender will
not provide his/her strategy as to how the sensor’s outputs are constructed to
the attacker. However, the problem still can be considered as a Stackelberg
game, where the sensor is the leader, because this is a passive defense mech-
anism that does not depend on the actual realizations, i.e., the sensor seeks
to minimize the expected cost, and the attacker, having access to the system,
can be aware of the switch to this passive defense mode and correspondingly
can know how the sensor outputs will have been constructed.
The main contributions and conclusions of this chapter are as follows:
 We study dynamic hierarchical Gaussian signaling games with finite
horizon for general quadratic cost functions and general class of mea-
surable policies.
 We formulate a functional minimization problem whose solutions corre-
spond to the equilibrium achieving signaling rules, and we characterize
2For linear signaling rules, the optimal control rules are also linear [56].
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the solutions through a finite dimensional optimization problem bound-
ing the original problem from below.
 We show that linear sender and receiver signaling rules can yield the
equilibrium for arbitrary (finitely many) number of stages within the
general class of measurable policies.
 We show that in multi-stage case, the sub-games at each-stage are not
decoupled and cannot be considered as single-stage games, where the
innovation part of the state is to be disclosed.
 We geometrically observe that linear strategies for Gaussian informa-
tion can achieve the equilibrium within the general class of measurable
policies because uncorrelatedness implies independence.
 Correspondingly, the proposed method, to characterize the solution via
lower bound, may not compute the optimal strategies for arbitrary dis-
tributions in general unless, e.g., the receivers’ strategies are restricted
to linear functions.
 We also argue that Gaussian distribution is the best distribution serving
the deceptive sender’s objectives.
 We extend the results to controlled Gauss-Markov processes and pro-
vide an algorithm to compute optimal linear sensor strategies numeri-
cally with global optimality guarantees in noncooperative control sce-
narios.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we provide the problem
description. In Section 2.2, we introduce and analyze strategic communica-
tion scenario, and we provide the equilibrium achieving policies in Section
2.3. In Section 2.4, we highlight intriguing properties of hierarchical signal-
ing games. We analyze strategic communication in noncooperative control
scenarios in Section 2.5. We provide numerical examples for different nonco-
operative communication and control scenarios in Section 2.6. We conclude








Figure 2.1: multi-stage signaling game model.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a controlled stochastic system described by the following state equa-
tion3:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +wk, (2.1)
for k = 1, . . . , n, where4 A ∈ Rp×p, B ∈ Rp×t, x1 ∼ N (0,Σ1). The additive noise
process {wk} is a white Gaussian vector process, e.g., wk ∼ N (0,Σw), and is
independent of the initial state x1. The closed-loop control vector uk ∈ Rt is
given by
uk = γk(y[1,k]), (2.2)
where γk(⋅) is a Borel measurable function from Rpk to Rt. The message
signal yk ∈ Rp is given by
yk = ηk(x1∶k), (2.3)
where ηk(⋅) is a Borel measurable function from Rpk to Rp. We assume that
the auto-covariance matrices Σ1 and Σw are all positive definite.
As seen in Fig. 2.1, we have two agents: Sender (PS) and Receiver (PR),
who select signaling rules under different objectives. For stage k, PS selects
the signaling rule ηk(⋅) from the policy space Ωk, which is the set of all Borel
measurable functions from Rkp to Rp, i.e., ηk ∈ Ωk, such that yk = ηk(x1∶k)
almost everywhere over Rp. On the other side, PR selects the signaling rule
3The provided derivations can be extended to time-variant cases rather routinely. And
the derivations can also be extended to the non-zero mean case in a straightforward way.
4We assume that the matrix A is non-singular.
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γk(⋅) from the policy space Γk, which is the set of all Borel measurable func-
tions from Rkp to Rt, i.e., γk ∈ Γk, such that uk = γk(y1∶k) almost everywhere
over Rt. PS and PR have different quadratic finite horizon cost functions5
JS(η1∶n, γ1∶n) and JR(η1∶n, γ1∶n), respectively, while each signaling rule im-
plicitly depends on the other. In the following, we introduce a hierarchical
equilibrium concept for the signaling rules with respect to these cost func-
tions, JS and JR. Particularly, we consider the situation where there is a
hierarchy between the agents in the announcement of the policies such that
PS leads the game by announcing and sticking to his/her policies beforehand
and PR reacts to those policies accordingly. We can model such a scheme
as a Stackelberg game between the players [3] such that the leader, i.e., PS,
chooses his signaling rule based on the corresponding best response of the
follower, i.e., PR.
Due to the hierarchy, PR’s signaling rule γk can depend on PS’s signal-
ing rules η1∶k. In order to explicitly show the dependence on PS’s policies,
henceforth, we denote PR’s policies by6 γk(η1∶k), i.e., γk(η1∶k)(yk) ∶= γk(y1∶k).
Then, for each n-tuple of policies ηk ∈ Ωk, k = 1, . . . , n, we let ΠR(η[1,n]) be
the reaction set of PR, as a subset of ⨉
n
k=1 Γk. For finite-horizon objectives,
we have




where γ1∶n(η1∶n) ∶= {γ1(η1), . . . , γn(η1∶n)}. In the following sections, when we
provide the objective functions for the associated scenarios explicitly, we will
also show that ΠR is an equivalence class such that all γ∗1∶n ∈ ΠR lead to
the same random variable u∗k almost surely under certain convexity assump-
tions. Therefore, the pair of signaling rules (η∗1∶n, γ
∗
1∶n) attains the multi-stage
Stackelberg equilibrium provided that










Remark. We note that the hierarchical equilibrium (2.4) implies that PS’s
5We provide these functions explicitly in the following sections in noncooperative com-
munication and control scenarios.
6Without loss of generality, we can also consider that γk(η1∶n) = γk(η1∶k).
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signaling rules do not depend on the realizations of the random variables
and all of them can be selected beforehand since they also do not depend on
PR’s signaling rules. Such an equilibrium formulation, where PS strategies
do not depend on the actual realizations, i.e., where PS does not have access
to the realizations, is essential for the cyber-security related applications in
order to avoid shortcuts that can cancel the proposed defense mechanism
once the attacker also infiltrates into PS. Furthermore, PS should anticipate
PR’s reaction to any selected strategy since even if PS might have incentive to
come up with another policy based on PR’s policy, any change in PS’s policy
would also imply a change in PR’s policy accordingly due to the hierarchy.
In the following sections, we analyze the equilibrium achieving signaling
rules in noncooperative communication and control scenarios.
2.2 Dynamic Gaussian Signaling in Communication
Systems
Here, we consider a strategic communication scenario, which is a special case
of (2.1), where B = O such that state {xk} is an exogenous process rather
than a controlled process. Following this, we use the results obtained to
characterize the equilibrium achieving linear signaling rules for the original
case (2.1), i.e., in a noncooperative control scenario. The underlying state,
now, is a Markov process (not necessarily stationary) evolving according to
first-order auto-regressive model:
xk+1 = Axk +wk, k = 1, . . . , n (2.5)
and at stage-k, state xk is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with auto-
covariance matrix Σk, which is given by the following recursion: Σk = AΣk−1A′+
Σw for k = 2, . . . , n. Note that if PS and PR have the same cost func-
tions, the best signaling rule of PS can be direct information disclosure,
i.e., ηk(x1∶k) = xk almost everywhere over Rp, since there is a perfect channel
between the agents. However, when PS and PR’s cost functions are different,
direct information disclosure may not be in PS’s best interest.
Consider the situation where PS and PR have the following quadratic finite
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where Qj,k ∈ Rr×p and Rj,k ∈ Rr×t. Note that uk = γk(η1∶k)(y1∶k) while y l =
ηl(x1∶l) almost surely. We assume that R′R,kRR,k is positive definite, i.e., RR,k
is full rank, for all k = 1, . . . , n. Then, there is a linear relationship between
the best R policies γ∗k and the posterior
x̂k ∶= E{xk∣y1∶k}
almost everywhere over Rp. Since B = O, by (2.6) for j = R, γk only impacts
the sub-cost function at stage-k, i.e., E{∥QR,kxk + RR,kuk∥2}. Correspond-
ingly, given η1∶k, the best PR strategy is given by
γ∗k(η1∶k) = arg min
γk∈Γk
E{∥QR,kxk +RR,kγk(η1∶k)(y1∶k)∥2}





almost everywhere over Rp, which also implies that PiR(η1∶n) is a singleton.
Example 2.1. This noncooperative communication formulation between PS
and PR also covers the schemes where there exist two separate exogenous




































































PR aims to track the process {zk} through the disclosed information yk while
PS wants PR’s decision uk to track a linear combination of zk and a bias















such that in (2.6) for j = S,R, QS,k = [I Dk], QR,k = [I O], and RS,k =
RR,k = −I for k = 1, . . . , n.
Corresponding to PR’s best reactions, PS seeks policies η∗k which minimize
the expected cost over ηk ∈ Ωk. Particularly, the optimization problem faced







E{∥QS,kxk −RS,k(R′R,kRR,k)−1R′R,kQR,k x̂k∥2} . (2.10)
Note that (2.10) is a functional optimization problem, where PS seeks to
find n functions among all Borel measurable functions from Rkp to Rp, for
k = 1, . . . , n. In order to find these functions, we first aim to formulate an
optimization problem over finite dimensional spaces that bounds the original
functional optimization problem (2.10) from below. The objective in (2.10)
is a quadratic function of xk and x̂k, and in the following we show that the
cost function (2.10) can be written in terms of the second-order moments of
xk and x̂k:
E{∥QS,kxk −RS,k(R′R,kRR,k)−1R′R,kQR,k x̂k∥2}
= E{x′kQ′S,kQS,kxk} − 2E{x̂′kΛ′kQS,kxk} +E{x̂′kΛ′kΛkx̂k},
where Λk ∶= RS,k(R′R,kRR,k)
−1R′R,kQR,k. Note that the first term on the right-
hand side does not include x̂k, and therefore does not depend on PS’s signal-








where ∆ is an arbitrary deterministic matrix with associated dimensions.
The equality (a) is due to the law of iterated expectations; (b) holds because
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x̂k is σ-y1∶k measurable; and (c) is due to x̂k = E{xk∣y1∶k}. Therefore,
2E{x̂′kΛ′kQS,kxk} = E{x̂′k(Λ′kQS,k +Q′S,kΛk)xk}
= E{x̂′k(Λ′kQS,k +Q′S,kΛk)x̂k} . (2.12)
































We point out that in Reference [22], the author addresses multidimensional
information disclosure for the single-stage case. To this end, he constructs a
Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) problem as a bound on sender’s objective
function (named utility function in [22]) and shows that linear strategies for
Gaussian parameters can achieve this bound. Here, we employ a similar
approach to extend these results to the dynamic settings by addressing the
question of whether the linear strategies are still optimal within the general
class of policies or not.
The first-order moment of x̂k is
E{x̂k} = E{E{xk∣y1∶k}}
= E{xk} = 0 (2.15)
by the law of iterated expectations. We define the covariance matrix of x̂k,
namely the posterior covariance, as Hk ∶= E{(x̂k − E{x̂k})(x̂k − E{x̂k})′} =
E{x̂kx̂′k}. We note that for multivariate Gaussian variables, the mean is well
defined, which implies that x̂k exists by the Radon-Nikodym theorem [57].
Furthermore, being multivariate Gaussian, the state parameter is integrable,
i.e., E{∣xk∣} < ∞, hence x̂k is finite almost surely, which implies that Hk =
E{x̂kx̂′k} also exists.
The following lemma provides a lower bound for the minimization problem
in (2.13).
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Lemma 2.1. There exists a semi-definite programming (SDP) problem bound-








subject to Σj ⪰ Sj ⪰ ASj−1A′ for j = 1, . . . , n, and S0 = O.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.1. The key point is that at
stage-k, the covariance of the posterior, i.e., Hk, is bounded from above by
the case when we disclose the information fully, i.e., Σk, and is bounded from
below by the case when we disclose no information yet PR can still infer xk
based on all previously sent signals y1∶k−1.
We point out that (2.16) is indeed an SDP problem [58]. There exist ef-
fective computational tools to solve SDP problems numerically, e.g., through
CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex programs [59, 60]. How-
ever, closed-form solutions can rarely be obtained [58]. Therefore, in order
to solve (2.16) analytically, we develop a different approach and character-
ize the solutions without computing them explicitly. The following theorem
characterizes the solution of (2.16) for an arbitrary (but finite) number of
stages.
Theorem 2.2. There exist symmetric idempotent matrices Pk ∈ Sp, for k =











for k = 1, . . . , n (with S∗0 = O), attains the global minimum of (2.16).
Proof. We first point out that the constraint set in (2.16), i.e.,
Ψ ∶= {(S1, ..., Sn) ∈ Sp × ... × Sp∣⋀
k
{Sk ∈ Ψk(Sk−1)}} , (2.18)
where Ψk(Sk−1) ∶= {Sk ∈ Sp ∣ Σk ⪰ Sk ⪰ ASk−1A′}, is convex. To show
this, consider n-tuples of symmetric matrices (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ Sp ×⋯×Sp and
(N1, . . . ,Nn) ∈ Sp × ⋯ × Sp such that both (M1, . . . ,Mn) and (N1, . . . ,Nn)
7Sp denotes the set of symmetric p × p matrices.
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are in the constraint set Ψ. Then, Ψ is a convex set if, and only if, for any
t ∈ [0,1], the linear combination
(E1, . . . ,En) ∶ = t(M1, . . . ,Mn) + (1 − t)(N1, . . . ,Nn)
= (tM1 + (1 − t)N1, . . . , tMn + (1 − t)Nn) ∈ Ψ.
Since Σ1 ⪰M1 ⪰ O and Σ1 ⪰ N1 ⪰ O, we have
Σ1 ⪰ tM1 + (1 − t)N1 ⪰ O,
and E1 = tM1 + (1 − t)N1 ∈ Ψ1(O). Suppose that Ej ∈ Ψj(Ej−1) for j =
1, . . . , k − 1. Since Σk ⪰ Mk ⪰ AMk−1A′, Σk ⪰ Nk ⪰ ANk−1A′, and Ek−1 =
tMk−1 + (1 − t)Nk−1, we obtain
Σk ⪰ tMk + (1 − t)Nk ⪰ AEk−1A
′,
and Ek = tMk + (1 − t)Nk ∈ Ψk(Ek−1). By induction, we conclude that the
convex combination (E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ and therefore Ψ is a convex set. Note
that since the objective function in (2.16) is linear in S1, . . . , Sn (not a zero
function) and the constraint set is non-empty compact (since Ψ is a Cartesian
product of the closed and bounded sets Ψk(Sk−1)) and convex, the global
minimum can be attained at the extreme points of Ψ.8
Next, we formulate the extreme points of Ψ. To this end, for given S−k ∶=
{S1, . . . , Sk−1, Sk+1, . . . , Sn}, we introduce the sub-constraint set:
Φk(S−k) ∶= {Sk ∈ Sp ∣ Σk ⪰ Sk ⪰ ASk−1A′
∧ A−1Sk+1(A
′)−1 ⪰ Sk ⪰ ASk−1A
′}, (2.19)
for each k = 1, . . . , n, where we set S0 = O and Sn+1 = AΣnA′ + Σw. We
consider that the sub-constraint set Φk(S−k) = ∅ is empty if Σk −ASk−1A′ or
A−1Sk+1(A′)−1 −ASk−1A′ are not positive semi-definite. Then, the following
lemma provides a necessary condition for the extreme points of Ψ in terms
of these sub-constraint sets (2.19).
Lemma 2.3. If an n-tuple (E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ is an extreme point of Ψ, then
8An extreme point of a convex set is a point that cannot be written as a convex
combination of any other points in the interior of the set.
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for each k = 1, . . . , n, Ek ∈ Φk(E−k) is an extreme point of Φk(E−k).
Proof. The proof can be shown via contradiction and is provided in Appendix
A.2.
Now, we seek to obtain the extreme points through the necessary condi-
tions provided in Lemma 2.3. Let (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n) ∈ Ψ be an extreme point of
Ψ. Then, the element S∗n should be an extreme point of Φn(S
∗
−n). To this
end, consider arbitrary S1, . . . , Sn. Then, in stage-n, the sub-constraint set
Φn(S−n) is given by
Φn(S−n) = {Sn ∈ Sp∣Σn ⪰ Sn ⪰ ASn−1A′}
since we set Sn+1 = AΣnA′ +Σw and
A−1(AΣnA
′ +Σw)(A
′)−1 = Σn +A
−1Σw(A
′)−1 ≻ Σn.
We note that for each k = 1, . . . , n, if Σk ⪰ Sk, then the matrix Σk+1 −ASkA′




′ = A(Σk − Sk)A
′ +Σw
and Σw ≻ O by definition. Then, if Σn−1 ⪰ Sn−1, we have Σn ≻ ASn−1A′ and
the following transformation:




such that Fn maps the sub-constraint set Φn(S−n) to
Fn(Φn(S−n)) = {P ∈ Sp∣I ⪰ P ⪰ O}. (2.21)
The following lemma characterizes the extreme points of the convex set Φ ∶=
{P ∈ Sp ∣ I ⪰ P ⪰ O}.
Lemma 2.4. A point Pe in Φ is an extreme point if, and only if, Pe is a
symmetric idempotent matrix.
Proof. The proof can be shown via contradiction and is provided in Appendix
A.3.
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We note that under bijective affine transformation of a convex set, the
extreme points are mapped to the extreme points of the transformed set [61].
Since Fn(⋅) is a bijective affine transformation, Po ∈ Φ is an extreme point
of Φ if, and only if, F −1n (Po) ∈ Φn(S−n) is an extreme point of Φn(S−n).
Therefore, if Σn−1 ⪰ Sn−1, the extreme points of Φn(S−n) are given by
S∗n = ASn−1A
′ + (Σn −ASn−1A
′)1/2Pn(Σn −ASn−1A
′)1/2,
where Pn is a symmetric idempotent matrix.
For stage-(n − 1), we have the sub-constraint set:
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) = {Sn−1 ∈ Sp∣Σn−1 ⪰ Sn−1 ⪰ ASn−2A′
∧ A−1Sn(A
′)−1 ⪰ Sn−1 ⪰ ASn−2A
′}.
We point out that if Sn−1 ∈ Φn−1(S−(n−1)), we have Σn−1 ⪰ Sn−1. Then, setting
Sn = S∗n, we obtain
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) = {Sn−1 ∈ Sp∣Σn−1 ⪰ Sn−1 ⪰ ASn−2A′
∧ Sn−1 +∆ ⪰ Sn−1 ⪰ ASn−2A
′},
where
∆ ∶= A−1(Σn −ASn−1A
′)1/2Pn(Σn −ASn−1A
′)1/2(A′)−1 ⪰ O.
Therefore, if Sn is an extreme point of Φn(S−n), the sub-constraint set
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) can be written as
Φn−1(S−(n−1)) = {Sn−1 ∈ Sp∣Σn−1 ⪰ Sn−1 ⪰ ASn−2A′}.
Correspondingly, if Σn−2 ⪰ Sn−2, the extreme points of Φn−1(S−(n−1)) are given
by
S∗n−1 = ASn−2A
′ + (Σn−1 −ASn−2A
′)1/2Pn−1(Σn−1 −ASn−2A
′)1/2,















Following identical steps, we obtain that any extreme point (S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n) of
Ψ should satisfy (2.17).
In the next section, we address the tightness of the bound (2.16), i.e.,
whether the minimum of the lower bound can be achieved through certain
sender policies or not.
2.3 Optimality of Linear Signaling Rules
Even though Theorem 2.2 characterizes the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the minimizing arguments of the SDP problem (2.16), it still does
not provide the solutions explicitly. However, as we will show next, these
results have important consequences in the characterization of equilibrium
achieving signaling rules for the original optimization problem (2.13). In
particular, sender strategies that can be constructed to yield posterior co-
variances in (2.17) can minimize the lower bound (2.16), and therefore can
minimize the main objective function (2.13).
The following theorem says that for any solution of (2.16), say S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n,
there exist certain deterministic matrices Lk ∈ Rp×p for k = 1, . . . , n, such that




almost everywhere over Rp, result in H1 = S∗1 , . . . ,Hn = S∗n. In particular,
by minimizing the lower bound on PS’s objective function, the memoryless
linear sender policies (2.22) yield the multi-stage Stackelberg equilibrium
within the general class of measurable policies.
Theorem 2.5. Let S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n be a solution of the SDP problem (2.16) and
P1, . . . , Pn be the corresponding symmetric idempotent matrices in (2.17). Let
Pk, k = 1, . . . , n, have the eigen decompositions: Pk = UkΛkU ′k. Then, for




memoryless linear sender strategies (2.22) yield the multi-stage equilibrium
(2.13) within the general class of policies.
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Proof. Say that PS employs memoryless linear policies as in (2.22) for some
deterministic combination of matrices L1, . . . , Ln ∈ Rp×p. Correspondingly,











×L′k(xk −Ax̂k−1) for k ≥ 2. (2.25)
Next, we seek to compute Hk = E{x̂kx̂′k}, for k = 1, . . . , n. By (2.24), we
obtain H1 = Σ1L1(L′1Σ1L1)
L′1Σ1 since E{x1x′1} = Σ1, and for a matrix M
and its pseudo-inverse M , we have M MM  = M . By (2.25), for H2, we
have a cross-term E{x̂1(x2 −Ax̂1)′}, which can be written as
E{x̂1(x2 −Ax̂1)′} = E{x̂1x′2} −E{x̂1x̂′1}A′ (2.26)
=H1A
′ −H1A
′ = O, (2.27)
due to the law of iterated expectations such that E{x̂1x′2} = E{E{x̂1x′2∣y1}} =
E{x̂1E{x′2∣y1}} = E{x̂1x̂′1}A′. Then, (2.25), for k ≥ 2, leads to
Hk = AHk−1A






Let C1 ∶= Σ
1/2
1 L1 and Ck ∶= (Σk − AHk−1A




















C ′k, for k = 1, . . . , n, is a symmetric idempotent ma-
trix and the posterior covariances H1, . . . ,Hn have identical expressions as
in (2.17). If the symmetric idempotent matrices Pk for k = 1, . . . , n cor-
responding to the minimizers of the SDP problem (2.16) have the eigen




C ′k = Pk. In particular, setting L1 = Σ
−1/2
1 U1Λ1 and
9We take the pseudo inverse of the matrices since they can be singular if the associ-
ated matrix Lk has a rank smaller than p. For example, at stage-k, PS can disclose no
information ηk(x1∶k) = 0.
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Table 2.1: A description to compute equilibrium achieving sender policies in
strategic communication.
Algorithm 2.1: Strategic Communication
SDP Problem:
Compute Vk, ∀k, by (2.14).
Solve the SDP problem (2.16) through a numerical toolbox
and obtain the solution S∗k , ∀k.
Equilibrium achieving policies:
Compute the corresponding idempotent matrices Pk,∀k,
by using the solution S∗k , ∀k, and (2.17).
Compute the eigen decompositions: Pk = UkΛkU ′k.
Compute Lk, ∀k, by using S∗k−1, Uk,Λk, and (2.23).
Lk = (Σk − AS∗k−1A
′)−1/2UkΛk, we obtain Hk = S∗k for k = 1, . . . , n. Hence,
the memoryless linear signaling rules (2.22) can minimize the main objective
function (2.13) within the general class of measurable policies.
In Table 2.1, we provide a description to compute the equilibrium achiev-
ing sender policies based on Lemma 2.1, and Theorems 2.2 and 2.5. We
note that for linear sender signaling rules, the corresponding equilibrium
achieving receiver signaling rules are also linear since the underlying state is
Gaussian. Therefore, linear sender and receiver signaling rules can achieve
the equilibrium also in multi-stage hierarchical Gaussian signaling games.
2.4 Intriguing Properties of Gaussian Signaling
In this section, we list several intriguing remarks related to the proposed
hierarchical signaling scheme:
Uniqueness of the Solution: In addition to the memoryless linear
sender strategies in Theorem 2.5, any signaling rule leading to the same pos-
teriors can yield the equilibrium. As an example, if yk = L′kxk for k = 1, . . . , n
achieves the equilibrium, then ỹ1 = y1 and ỹk = yk−E{yk∣y1∶k−1} for k = 2, . . . , n
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lead to the same posteriors, i.e., E{xk∣ỹ1∶k} = E{xk∣y1∶k} for k = 1, . . . , n, there-
fore yield the equilibrium. Note that ỹ1∶n is a whitened version of y1∶n, i.e.,
ỹk’s are pair-wise independent of each other.
Inter-stage Coupling: In general, when PS and PR have different cost
functions, signaling rules: ηk(x1∶k) =K ′k(xk −E{xk∣x1∶k−1}), for certain matri-
ces Kk ∈ Rp×p (where xk − E{xk∣x1∶k−1} = wk−1 is the innovation in the state
process) do not lead to the equilibrium, contrary to the case when they have
the same cost functions. In particular, in the multi-stage case, the sub-games
at each stage are not decoupled and cannot be considered as a single-stage
game as if the innovation part of the state is going to be disclosed. As an
























′ + (Σ3 −AS2A
′)1/2P3(Σ3 −AS2A
′)1/2.
















Note that the left-hand side of (2.30) is a symmetric idempotent matrix,
however, the right-hand side is not necessarily an idempotent matrix.
Applicability to Noisy Observations: The results would hold if the
message space was larger than p since it would also lead to the same constraint
set Ψ (2.18). However, the derivations would not carry over if PS had access
to noisy version of the state instead of the actual state. As an example,
consider the situation where PS has access to sk = Cxk + vk, where C ∈ Rp×p
and {vk ∼ N (0,Σv)} is an independent white Gaussian noise process. Then,
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of Σ1 and S∗ for n = 2.




















and due to the underbraced term, (Σk −AHk−1A′)−1/2(Hk −AHk−1A′)(Σk −
AHk−1A′)−1/2 would not lead to a symmetric idempotent matrix, contrary to
(2.29).
Applicability to Different Dimensional Signals: For the single-stage

















1 corresponding to negative eigenvalues. This also implies that in
the multi-stage case, i.e., n > 1, the rank of Lk is bounded from above by the
number of negative eigenvalues of Vk due to Sylvester’s law of inertia [62].
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Applicability to Different Information Models: For the single-stage






almost everywhere over Rp, where Q = [Q− Op×(p−m)]. When we take a
closer look at (2.32) for p = 2, we observe that the signal should not be





1 associated with positive eigenvalue) while it should be fully in-
formative another direction (e.g., the direction of the eigenvector associated
with negative eigenvalue), which has also been illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Then,
the optimal signaling rule for Gaussian information case, i.e., (2.33), is just a
projection of the information onto the direction (expected to be fully infor-
mative) through a linear signaling rule. Since the signals in the orthogonal
directions10 are uncorrelated with each other and they are jointly Gaussian,
the orthogonality implies that they are independent of each other. Corre-
spondingly, any information on one of them, e.g., vertical direction, does
not provide any information about the other, e.g., horizontal direction, since
the posterior conditioned on independent information is just the same with
the posterior without conditioning on any information. However, this is not
the case for arbitrary information models, e.g., other than Gaussian, since
uncorrelatedness does not imply independence in general.
In particular, Fig. 2.3 illustrates this for p = 2 and when the underlying
coordinates, i.e., Rp, have been transformed linearly such that Σ1 = I over
the new coordinates. We seek to design the signaling rule such that the
signal is fully informative in the left-tilted direction while not informative
in the right-tilted direction. The projection onto the left-tilted direction is
fully informative in that direction. However, such a projection implies that
the realized information can be at any point on the line passing through
the projection, and parallel to the right-tilted direction according to the un-
derlying distribution. For the Gaussian case, the corresponding posterior is
just on the left-tilted direction since Σ1 = I. However, for arbitrary distri-
butions, the posterior conditioned on the parallel lines may not be on the
left-tilted direction, as seen in Fig. 2.3, and any deviation of the posterior
from the left-tilted direction implies that the projection-based signaling is





Figure 2.3: For p = 2, we show how informative the signal is in the other
direction if the signal is the projection of the realization on the left-tilted
direction for arbitrary distribution (on the left sub-figure) and Gaussian dis-
tribution (on the right sub-figure) while Σ1 = I. Particularly, the projection
implies that the realization could be at any point on the line passing through
the projection, and parallel to the right-tilted direction. Conditioned on that,
the posterior (marked with red dots) may not be on the left-tilted direction,
i.e., the projection can also be informative on the right-tilted direction for
arbitrary distributions.
also informative on the right-tilted direction. Therefore, the covariance of
the posterior, i.e., E{x̂1x̂′1}, would not be equal to the solution of the lower
bound (2.32) through such a linear (or indeed any) signaling rule for arbitrary
distributions in general.
Optimality of Gaussian Information for Deception: What we have
observed above also implies that Gaussian distribution is the best distribu-
tion serving deceptive PS’s objective since the lower bound is not necessarily
tight for other distributions. Additionally, if PR’s policies are restricted to
linear functions, then the proposed approach also computes the optimal sig-
naling rule for arbitrary distributions, since uncorrelatedness yields linear
independence.
In the next section, we compute the optimal linear signaling rules in non-
cooperative control scenarios, e.g., B ≠ O in (2.1).
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2.5 Dynamic Gaussian Signaling in Control Systems
Returning back to the general scenario (2.1), we now consider the situation
where PS and PR have the following quadratic finite horizon cost functions,








where Qj,k+1 ∈ Rp×p are positive semi-definite and Rj,k ∈ Rt×t are positive
definite.
For discrete-time linear Gaussian stochastic systems and in scalar settings,
if the measurement signals and the control inputs can be constructed within
the class of general policies, and there exists an additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel between the sensor and the controller, reference [63]
has shown that in the simultaneous (or cooperative) design, the optimal
performance in terms of quadratic cost functions can be obtained through
linear control inputs, and measurement signals which are linear in the in-
novation in the state. However, the linear measurement signals may not
be optimal for the multidimensional cases in general. Furthermore, again
in a cooperative setting, reference [64] has formulated the joint sensor and
controller design problem over a perfect channel when there exists additive
(privacy-preservation induced) information-theoretic cost of communication
in addition to the quadratic control cost similar to (2.34). And the authors
have addressed the problem when the sensor’s policies are restricted to a lin-
ear structure and provided an SDP-based algorithm to compute the optimal
strategies [64].
Remark. We note that this stochastic control problem entails non-classical
information in the general settings, where PS selects signaling rules within
the general class of measurable policies, since PS’s signaling rules are func-
tions of the actual state (correspondingly the control inputs) and both players
can exploit this via triggering-based threat strategies in this noncooperative
dynamic setting [3, 65]. Correspondingly, optimality of linear sender strate-
gies is still an open problem, and linearity may or may not hold within the
general class of strategies.
However, here, we restrict PS’s signaling rules to memoryless linear strate-
gies as in [64] and in the following, we provide an SDP-based efficient al-
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gorithm to compute the optimal sender strategies numerically with global
optimality guarantees. Particularly, PS selects η`k from the space of all linear
functions from Rp to Rp, denoted by Ω`, such that the signal y` = η`k(xk)
almost everywhere over Rp. Correspondingly, there exist certain matrices
Lk ∈ Rp×p such that y`k = L′kxk almost everywhere over Rp. We note that PR
still selects his/her strategies from Γk, k = 1, . . . , n.
The above is a general framework for noncooperative game formulations
between PS and PR, which permits analysis of the equilibrium achieving sig-
naling rules in the most general form. By adjusting the matrices, it is possible
to generate many different examples of stochastic control/game problems in
strategic environments.






















































































PR seeks to drive zk into his/her desired path, but the control variable uk has
also impact on the state θk and PS designs the measurement signals so that
θk is driven into his own desired path not in line with PR’s actual intent. In














































Example 2.3. Another special case is one where while PR seeks to drive zk
into his/her desired path, PS wants zk to track an exogenous process θk, i.e.,
























Qθ,k [I −Dk] in (2.34), while PR’s cost
function is given by (2.35).
In order to address the hierarchical signaling in noncooperative control
scenarios, rather routinely by completing the squares [63], for j = S,R, we








E{∥uk +Kj,kxk∥2∆j,k} +∆j,0, (2.36)
where11 Kj,k = ∆−1j,kB
′Q̃j,k+1A, ∆j,k = B′Q̃j,k+1B +Rj,k,


















E{∥uj,k +Kj,kxok∥2∆j,k} , (2.38)




Remark. In the cooperative settings, (2.38) would imply that the optimal




}. As an example, we would have u∗R,1 = −KR,1E{xo1∣y`1} and
u∗R,2 = −KR,2E{xo2∣y`1,y`2}, and correspondingly, the optimal control inputs








R,1, almost everywhere over
Rt. However, in the noncooperative settings, even though the control-free
process {xok} is independent of how the control inputs uk’s are constructed,
the sensor outputs y`k depend on the state xk and correspondingly on the
previous control inputs u1∶k−1. Therefore, while constructing the control in-
puts in the noncooperative settings, PR should also consider their impact on
the future stages, as also pointed out in the remark above.
However, the following lemma shows that PR cannot influence how PS
11The assumption Rj,k ≻ O ensures that ∆j,k is non-singular.
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selects his/her linear signaling rules strategically.
Lemma 2.6. For a controlled Gauss-Markov process {xk} evolving according
to (2.1) and the control-free state {xok} evolving according to (2.39), we have
E{xok∣L′1x1, . . . , L′kxk} = E{xok∣L′1xo1, . . . , L′kxok}, (2.40)
where Lj ∈ Rp×p, j = 1, . . . , k.













almost everywhere over Rp, where the under-braced term is σ-y`1∶k−1 mea-
surable for all k = 1, . . . , n, which implies (2.40). However, this would not
necessarily be the case for nonlinear signaling rules in general since the pre-
vious control inputs could limit the informativeness of the current signal.
◻
Based on Lemma 2.6, the problem faced by PS, i.e., (2.38), is just a strate-
gic information disclosure problem. Therefore, after some algebra, similar to
the lines followed in Section 2.2, the problem can also be written as an affine










for certain symmetric deterministic matrices V ok ∈ Rp×p, k = 1, . . . , n, which
are given by





l−k + (Al−k)′Ξl,k, (2.43)
and Ξk,l is the corresponding p × p sub-block of Ξ, which is given by






oK ′S∆SKS} +∆S,0, (2.45)
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where Σo ∶= E{xo(xo)′}, xo ∶= [xon ⋯ xo1]
′
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for j = S,R. Then, Theorems 2.2 and 2.5 show that given Vk’s, we can
compute the optimal linear signaling rules via Algorithm 2.1. In the following
corollary of these theorems, we recap the results.
Corollary 2.7. We can compute the optimal linear signaling rules in non-
cooperative control settings by computing (2.43) based on (2.37) and (2.44)-
(2.47), and then applying Algorithm 2.1 for (2.42).
2.6 Illustrative Examples
As numerical illustrations of Algorithm 2.1, we consider Example 2.1 in
strategic communication formulation with cost functions (2.8) and (2.9),
where zk ∈ R, θk ∈ R, and Dk = 1. We consider two different scenarios:
Scenario 1, where the process {zk} is relatively more colored, i.e., more cor-
related in time, than the process {θk}, and Scenario 2, where the process
{θk} is more colored. To this end, we set Σk and A as in (2.48) and (2.49),
introduced as parts of Figs. 2.4 and 2.5, respectively, which yields that the
underlying state process {xk ∈ R2} is stationary and Σw = I.
We can compute the equilibrium achieving sender policies via Algorithm
2.1. After the computation, we observe that the resulting weight matrices
Lk ∈ R2×2, ∀k, have rank 1, and indeed have a column that is full of zeros.
Therefore, we can consider that at stage k, PS sends practically a scalar
which is a linear combination of zk and θk to R. Additionally, we can scale
that sent signal by multiplying it with a certain constant such that the weight
39
























Figure 2.4: Scenario 1: the process {zk} is relatively less colored, i.e., less
correlated in time, than the process {θk}.























Figure 2.5: Scenario 2: the process {zk} is relatively more colored.
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Figure 2.6: Scenario 3: the process {zk} is relatively less colored in nonco-
operative control.
of zk in the message is just 1. In particular, the sent signal can be written
as yk = zk + αkθk for a certain constant αk ∈ R. In Figs. 2.4 and 2.5, we
plot the time evolution of αk for different time horizons, e.g., n = 1, . . . ,10, in
the Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. We observe that the weight of zk and θk
increases or decreases in time depending on their relative correlatedness in
time. As an example, in Scenario 1, the process {θk} is relatively more colored
than the process {zk} and the weight of θk, i.e., αk, in the sent messages
increases in time compared to the weight of zk, i.e., 1. Additionally, the
pattern that the weight αk draws as the length of time horizon grows provides
an insight for the equilibrium achieving sender policies for stationary state
processes in infinite time horizon, e.g., after a transient phase, the weights
could reach a steady state value as n→∞.
Furthermore, we also consider Example 2.3 within the noncooperative con-
trol formulation, where zk ∈ R, θk ∈ R, and Dk = 1. Different from the pre-















and similar to Scenarios 1 and
2, we consider two new scenarios: Scenario 3, where the process {zk} is rela-
tively more colored than the process {θk}, and Scenario 4, where the process
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Figure 2.7: Scenario 4: the process {zk} is relatively more colored in nonco-
operative control.
{θk} is more colored. To this end, we set Qθ,k = Qz,k = RS,k = RR,k = 1, and
A, B, and Σok as in (2.50) and (2.51), introduced as parts of Figs. 2.6 and
2.7, respectively, which yields that the underlying control-free state process
{xk ∈ R2}, introduced in (2.39), is stationary and Σw = I. Similar to Scenar-
ios 1 and 2, we also observe that all the optimal weight matrices Lk ∈ R2×2
have rank 1 and PS practically sends a scalar variable. Therefore, in Figs.
2.6 and 2.7, we plot the change of αk within various time horizons, where
yk = zk + αkθk. We also note that the evolution of αk is very much also de-
pendent on B in addition to the relative colorfulness of the processes {zk}
and {θk}.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have addressed the existence and characterization of the
equilibrium achieving sender strategies in hierarchical signaling games with
finite horizon, for quadratic objective functions and multivariate Gaussian
processes. Our main conclusion has been that linear sender and receiver
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strategies can yield the equilibrium within the general class of policies in
strategic communication scenarios. This settles an open question on the
structure of equilibrium achieving policies in dynamic strategic information
transmission within a Stackelberg game framework. We have observed that
independence of uncorrelated Gaussian parameters plays a significant role in
the optimality of linear signaling rules. Furthermore, Gaussian distribution is
the best distribution serving the deceptive sender’s objectives. We have also
provided algorithms to compute optimal linear strategies numerically with
global optimality guarantees in noncooperative communication and control
scenarios.
Some future directions of research on this topic include characterization of
the equilibrium achieving strategies in closed forms, and analysis of equilib-




Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible.
– General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson
Cyber connectedness of physical systems makes them vulnerable against
cyber attacks which could have undesirable physical outcomes, e.g., dam-
ages [66,67]. Different from the vulnerability of computer systems in a cyber
network, cyber connectedness of physical systems brings in new and distinct
security challenges due to the inherent physical dynamics. Cyber attacks can
be very strategic while disturbing the system to achieve a certain malicious
goal and therefore they differ from external disturbances that can be mod-
eled, e.g., statistically or within certain bounds, for robust control system
design. Cyber attacks can be advanced and very target specific by learning
the system’s dynamics and tuning their attack specific to the underlying sys-
tem and the existing defensive measures for success and stealthiness. To cite
a recent occurrence of such an event, in 2014, Dragonfly Malware intervened
the operation of many cyber-physical, e.g., process control, systems in energy
and pharmaceutical industries across the world over a long period of time
without being detected [68]. Therefore, it is crucial that we develop novel
security mechanisms against such attackers for the security of cyber-physical
systems.
Prior Literature In a physical system, advance attackers can seek to
evade detection mechanisms by manipulating the physical signals used by
the detectors. For example, in [69], the authors have introduced false data
injection attacks, where the attackers can inject data into the sensor outputs,
in the context of state estimation, and characterized undetectable attacks.
The ensuing studies mainly focused on characterizing the vulnerabilities of
control systems against such evasive attacks and designing counter measures
to be able to detect them. In [70], the authors have introduced replay attacks
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where the attacker records and replays the sensor outputs when the system is
at steady state since they are expected to be similar. As a counter measure,
an independent signal can be injected into the control input to detect such
attacks at the expense of degradation in control performance [70,71]. In [72,
73], the authors have characterized the reachable set that an evasive attacker
can drive the system by injecting data into sensor outputs and control inputs
jointly.
Within deterministic control scenarios, in [74], the authors have analyzed
open-loop stealthy attacks, and proposed to add new measurements as a
counter measure, as in [70]. In [75], the authors have formulated the limita-
tions of monitoring-based detection mechanisms against false data injection
and replay attacks. In [76], the authors have proposed decoding schemes to
estimate the state based on sensor outputs while a subset of them could have
been under attack. The attackers can also have adversarial control objectives.
In [77,78], the authors have analyzed such attacks, where the attacker seeks
to drive the state of the system according to his adversarial goal evasively by
manipulating sensor outputs and control inputs jointly. In [79], the authors
have analyzed optimal attack strategies to maximize the quadratic cost of a
system with linear Gaussian dynamics without being detected. In [80], the
authors have proposed linear encoding schemes for sensor outputs of an LQG
system in order to enhance detectability of false data injection attacks while
the encoding matrix is assumed oblivious to the attackers.
Motivation We address, in this chapter, primarily the following two ques-
tions: “If we have already designed the sensor outputs, in a non-Bayesian
setting, to what extent would we have secured the system against multiple
type advanced and evasive attackers who can bypass/hijack the defensive
measures to fulfill a certain malicious control objective?” And “what would
be the best affine sensor outputs that can deceive such attackers about the
underlying state of the system so that their actions/attacks would not lead to
any degradation?” We consider attackers who have malicious control objec-
tives misaligned with the normal operation of the system, but not completely
opposite of it as in the framework of a zero-sum game. This implies that there
is a part of the malicious objective that is benign. Correspondingly, the at-
tacker would be acting in line with the normal operation of the system with
respect to the aligned part of his objective. Our motivation is to restrain the
attacker’s abilities so that he/she will not act along the misaligned part of
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the objectives while taking actions in line with the aligned part. To this end,
we propose to design the information available to an attacker strategically
since the attacker would be making decisions to fulfill a malicious objective
based on the information available to him/her. By designing the sensor out-
puts strategically, our goal is to control the attacker’s perception about the
underlying system, and correspondingly to persuade the attacker (without
any explicit enforcement) to fulfill the aligned part of the objectives as much
as possible without fulfilling the misaligned part.
We have partially addressed this challenge in Chapter 2 in non-cooperative
communication settings. For a discrete-time Gauss-Markov process, and
when the sender and the receiver have misaligned quadratic objectives, we
have shown the optimality of linear signaling rules within the general class
of measurable policies and provided an algorithm to compute the optimal
policies numerically. This chapter differs from Chapter 2 in the sense that
it addresses optimal linear plus noise signaling for the scenarios where the
distribution over the private type of the controller is not known. Further-
more here we provide a comprehensive formulation by considering also the
cases where the sensor could have partial or noisy information on the signal
of interest and relevance. Further details on this will be given next as part of
our description of the main contributions of this work, as well as throughout
the chapter.
Contributions of This Chapter To obtain explicit results, we specifi-
cally consider systems with linear Gaussian dynamics and quadratic control
objectives, which have various industrial applications [79] from manufactur-
ing processes to aerospace control. We consider the possibility of adversarial
intervention by multiple advanced and evasive attackers across control net-
works. The attackers have different long-term control objectives. Due to the
stochastic nature of the problem, i.e., due to the presence of state noise, any
open-loop control strategy of an attacker could not drive the system along
his desired path effectively. Therefore, regardless of whether the controller
has an adversarial objective or not, it has to generate a closed-loop con-
trol input using the designed sensor outputs. We also consider the scenarios
where the advanced attackers could learn the relationship between the sen-
sor output and the state, i.e., the designed signaling rule, in order to avoid
any obscurity based defense, which can be bypassed once the advanced at-
tacker learns the information in obscurity. This implies that the interaction
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between the sensor and the attackers could be modeled as a hierarchical dy-
namic game [3], where the sensor leads the game by announcing its strategy
in advance. Therefore, while designing the sensor outputs, we should con-
sider the possibility of malicious or benign control inputs and defend against
the worst possible distribution over them.
Specifically, we seek to determine optimal affine sensor strategies for con-
trolled Gauss-Markov processes, where the sensor can have partial or noisy
measurements. We only consider affine signaling rules, since under such
rules our setting entails a classical information model, whereas without such
a structural restriction on the signaling rules, the underlying model features a
non-classical information due to the asymmetry of information between the
players and the dynamic interaction through closed-loop feedback signals.
The follower, i.e., the attacker, has a private type while the distribution over
the types is not known by the leader, i.e., the sensor. Our goal is to defend
against the worst possible distribution over these types. To this end, we
provide an equivalent problem faced by the sensor in terms of the covariance
of the posterior estimate of the (control-free) state by formulating necessary
and sufficient conditions on that covariance matrix. This new equivalent
problem is linear in the optimization argument with a compact and convex
constraint set.
We emphasize that what we have is an exact equivalence relation. Based
on this exact equivalence relation, we can provide an offline algorithm to
compute the optimal affine sensor strategies. In particular, in order to de-
termine the best signaling rule against multiple types of attackers, we intro-
duce additional constraints on the equivalent problem, which implies that
the equivalence in optimality is not a sufficient condition in that respect. We
had noted earlier for multiple attack types with known distribution over them
that the optimum can be attained at the extreme points of the constraint
set [39, 40] since the equivalent problem is linear in the optimization argu-
ment and the constraint set is compact and convex [81]. And, further the
corresponding covariance matrices could be attained through certain linear
signaling rules, where the sensor does not introduce any additional indepen-
dent noise. However, when we defend against multiple types of attackers
with the worst possible distribution over them as here, the new problem im-
poses additional linear constraints on the equivalent problem. With these
new constraints, even though the optimum will be attained at the extreme
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points of this modified constraint set, there can be cases where the optimum
may be attained only at non-extreme points of the original constraint set
before the modification. Such covariance matrices could be attained through
certain linear-plus-noise signaling rules.
We now list the main contributions of this chapter as follows:
 We introduce a robust sensor design agent that can craft the measure-
ments sent to the noiseless communication network in order to defend
against multiple advanced and evasive attackers with long-term control
objectives that are misaligned with the normal operation of the system.
 We show the optimality of memoryless signaling rules within the general
class of signaling rules with complete/bounded memory when the sensor
has access to the underlying state of the system.
 We show that the optimal signaling rule dictates the sensor to possibly
introduce additive independent noise into the sensor outputs if there
are multiple types of attackers.
 We extend the results to the cases where the sensor has partial or noisy
information on the signal of interest and relevance.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we formulate the robust
sensor design game. In Section 3.2, we analyze the equilibrium of the robust
sensor design game under perfect measurements. In Section 3.3, we extend
the results to the cases where there are partial or noisy measurements. In
Section 3.4, we examine numerically the performance of the proposed scheme
for various scenarios. We conclude the chapter in Section 3.5 with several
remarks and possible research directions.
3.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a cyber-physical control system, seen in Fig. 3.1, whose underlying
state dynamics and sensor measurements are described, respectively, by:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +wk, (3.1)




















Figure 3.1: Cyber-physical systems equipped with sensor design component
in the physical part as a deceptive defense mechanism against advanced eva-
sive attackers who can intervene through the noiseless communication chan-
nel, e.g, controller area network (CAN bus) in a vehicle.
for k = 1, . . . , κ, where1 A ∈ Rm×m,B ∈ Rm×r, and C ∈ Rm×m, and the initial
state x1 ∼ N (0,Σ1). The additive state and measurement noise sequences
{wk} and {vk}, respectively, are white Gaussian vector processes, i.e., wk ∼
N (0,Σw) and vk ∼ N (0,Σv); and are independent of the initial state x1 and
of each other. As seen in Fig. 3.1, the signal sk ∈ Rm, which can be different
from the measurement yk ∈ Rm, is given by the affine signaling rule:
sk = ηk(y1∶k) (3.3)
= L′k,kyk + . . . +L
′
k,1y1 +nk, (3.4)
where Lk,j ∈ Rm×m, j = 1, . . . , k, can be any deterministic matrix, and nk ∼
N (0,Θk) is independent of every other parameter. Let Υk denote the set
of such affine signaling rules from Rmk to Rm, i.e., ηk ∈ Υk. Furthermore,
the closed-loop control input uk ∈ Rr, which is constructed by the controller
1Even though we consider time invariant matrices A,B, and C, for notational simplicity,
the provided results could be extended to time-variant cases rather routinely. Furthermore,
we consider all the random parameters to have zero mean; however, the derivations can
be extended to non-zero mean case in a straightforward way.
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located in the cyber-part of the system, is given by
uk = γk(s1∶k), (3.5)
almost everywhere over Rr, where γk(⋅) can be any Borel measurable function
from Rmk to Rr. Let Γk denote the set of all Borel measurable functions from
Rmk to Rr, i.e., γk ∈ Γk.
Particularly, the dynamic system, measurement system, and actuators are
located in the physical part while the controller is located in the cyber part
through a connection over a noiseless communication channel. However, the
connectivity over the channel is vulnerable to cyber attacks. We consider
the scenarios where advanced and evasive attackers can intervene through
the channel by injecting malicious control inputs to drive the underlying
state according to a malicious long-term control objective and can bypass
or hijack the detection-based defensive measures. Our goal is to produce
defense against such advanced evasive attacks by crafting the attacker’s per-
ceptions about the underlying state of the system strategically so that their
actions/attacks would not be harmful (to the extent possible) and would
be along the desired objectives. To this end, we introduce a robust-secure-
sensor-design component, denoted by PS, in the physical plant that gets the
sensor measurement yk as an input and constructs the signal sk, given by
(3.3), and feeds this signal to the noiseless communication channel. Even
if there is an attacker intervening over the channel, that attacker can only
access that signal sk related to the underlying state of the system.
Remark (Sensor Placement). Note that if the signal sk is memoryless, then









= C̃kxk + tvk,
where tvk ∼ N (0, L′k,kΣvLk,k +Θk), such that C̃k ∈ Rm×m is the gain matrix in
the measurement while tvk is the white Gaussian measurement noise. There-
fore, the optimal signaling rules η∗1∶κ can provide a guideline to engineer (or
designer) the placement of the physical sensors to monitor the underlying
state of the system securely or to assess the resiliency against attacks with
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long-term control objectives.
The normal operation of the system, i.e., when there is no adversarial inter-
vention by the attackers, is a stochastic control setting, where the controller,
denoted by PC , constructs the control inputs uk ∈ Γk to minimize a finite










where2 Q ∈ Sm is positive-semi definite and R ∈ Sr+ is positive definite. PS se-
lects the signaling rule η1∶κ to minimize the same cost function with PC , i.e.,
(3.6), as a team. And if there were no possibility for an adversarial inter-
vention, PS could be as informative as disclosing the measurement directly
to PC since there is no cost for the disclosed information over the noiseless
communication channel. However, as seen in Fig. 3.1, there can be advanced
and evasive adversarial interventions in the noiseless communication chan-
nel between the dynamic system and PC . We particularly consider multiple
(finitely many) types of attackers who can inject malicious closed-loop control











where Qα ∈ Sm is positive semi-definite and Rα ∈ Sr is positive-definite.
Example 3.1 (A Special Case). The attacker objective (3.7) also covers the
special cases where the attacker seeks to regularize the underlying state {xk}
around an external process, e.g., {zαk}, rather than the zero vector. To this






associated weight matrix in the regularization, i.e., Qα in (3.7), accordingly.
Since our aim is to defend against advanced and evasive attackers, we
consider the scenarios where there exists a hierarchy between the defender,
i.e., PS, and the attackers such that each type of attacker is aware of PS’s
signaling rules η1∶κ by testing and learning the system’s dynamics once they
are deployed publicly. Different from [34,39,40], in this chapter, PS does not
know the underlying distribution governing the attackers’ types and seeks
2For notational simplicity, we consider time-invariant Q and R. However, the results
provided could be extended to the general time-variant case rather routinely.
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to defend against the worst possible distribution. Particularly, PS designs
the secure sensor outputs such that PS’s cost is minimized in expectation
with respect to the worst possible true distribution of types within a robust
setting.
Remark (Game-theoretic View). This can be viewed as a game, where PS de-
signs the signaling rule η1∶κ within a hierarchical setting, where the con-
trollers, PC with different benign/malicious types, and the adversary (PA),
determining the distribution of types, are aware of the signaling rules. There-
fore, PS anticipates reactions of different types of controllers and the worst
possible distribution over those types while selecting the signaling rule η1∶κ
to minimize (3.6).
3.1.1 Game Model
We consider a game with three players: PS, PC , and PA. PC can have
different private types. Let Ω denote the finite set of all (benign/malicious)
controller types. Correspondingly, depending on the type ω ∈ Ω, PC selects
the control rule γωk ∈ Γk. PS designs the signaling rule η1∶κ to minimize the
expected cost, where the expectation is taken over all the randomness (due to
the initial state, and state and measurement noises), and the distribution of
types, determined by PA. Let p ∶= {pω}ω∈Ω denote the probabilities of types





















































1∶κ}, p) = −US(η1∶κ,{γ
ω
1∶κ}, p), (3.10)
respectively, where we represent the dependence of the state on the con-
troller’s type, ω, due to the control input in the state recursion (3.1) explic-
itly through xωk (and the signal y
ω
k ) instead of xk (and yk). Then, the robust
sensor design game is defined as follows:
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C(⋅), US(⋅), UA(⋅)) (3.11)
is a Stackelberg game [3] between PS, PC , and PA, where PS is the leader
while PC and PA are the followers, reacting to the leader’s announced strate-
gies. PC ’s type is drawn according to PA’s action p ∈ ∆∣Ω∣ and his/her
strategy space is Γk at stage k. PS’s strategy space is Υk at each stage
k and PA’s action space is the simplex ∆∣Ω∣. Objectives of PC , PS, and























where, with abuse of notation, we denote type-ω PC ’s strategy γωk by γ
ω
k (η1∶k)
to show the dependence of type-ω PC ’s strategies on PS’s signaling rules due
to the hierarchy, explicitly, and we define γω1∶κ(η1∶κ) ∶= {γ
ω
1 (η1), . . . , γ
ω
κ (η1∶κ)}.
Remark (Uniqueness of Follower Reactions). The reaction set of type-ω PC is
an equivalence class such that all γω∗1∶κ in the reaction set lead to the same
control input uω∗k almost surely under certain convexity assumptions, e.g.,
Rω ≻ O is positive-definite, which will be shown in detail in Section 3.2.
Furthermore, the reaction set of PA is also an equivalence class due to the
zero-sum relation between the cost functions US and UA.
Remark (Decoupled Follower Objectives). Given PS’s signaling rule, PC ’s
objective UωC , for ω ∈ Ω, is decoupled from the other follower PA’s action while
PA’s objective UA depends on different type PC ’s strategies. Therefore, this
can be viewed as a sequential optimization between the two followers, where
firstly PC selects his/her strategy optimizing his/her objective (3.8) given
the leader’s strategy, and then PA takes action corresponding to the leader’s
strategy and the PC ’s optimal reaction to optimize his/her objective (3.10).
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3.2 Robust Sensor Design in LQG Control
We first assume, in this section, that PS has access to perfect measurements,
i.e., yk = xk for k = 1, . . . , κ; the general noisy/partial measurements case will








where γω∗1∶κ(η1∶κ) is given by (3.12b). This is a highly nonlinear and non-
convex problem. However, the following theorem provides an equivalent semi-
definite programming (SDP) problem, which is not limited to equivalence in
optimality as in Chapter 2, so that we can address the equilibrium for the
robust sensor design game G in a compact way.
Theorem 3.1 (Equivalence Result). Let the convex and compact set Ψ be
defined as
Ψ ∶= {(Sk ∈ Sm)κk=1 ∣Σok ⪰ Sk ⪰ ASk−1A′, k = 1, . . . , κ, S0 = O} , (3.14)
where Σok ∈ Sm is the covariance matrix of the control-free process:
xok+1 = Ax
o
k +wk and x
o
1 = x1, (3.15)
i.e., xok ∼ N (0,Σ
o
k) and
3 Σok ∶= E{xok(xok)′}. Then, given p ∈ ∆∣Ω∣, for any









pωVk(ω))} + vo, (3.16)
where V1∶κ(ω) and vo are deterministic parameters that do not depend on S1∶κ
and derived in Appendix B.2. Furthermore, for any S1∶κ ∈ Ψ, there exists a






pωVk(ω))} + vo = US(η1∶κ,{γ
ω∗
1∶κ(η1∶κ)}ω∈Ω, p). (3.17)
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows: i) we first show that the optimization
3Note that Σok = AΣok−1A′ +Σw.
54
function can be written as a linear function of the covariance of the posterior
control-free state, i.e.,
Hk ∶= cov{E{xok∣s1∶k}}, (3.18)
for k = 1, . . . , κ; ii) we then identify the necessary condition on H1∶κ, which
is indeed the constraint set Ψ, i.e., H1∶κ ∈ Ψ; and finally iii) we show that
the constraint set Ψ is also a sufficient condition for H1∶κ since any point in
Ψ can be attained through certain linear plus noise signaling rule. We now
provide details of each of these steps.
Step i) Our first goal is to isolate the underlying state from the control
input by completing the squares in the cost functions and through change of
variables, which yields the result that given positive semi-definite Qω ∈ Sm













E{∥uok +Kωk xok∥2∆ωk } +∆
ω
0 , (3.19)
where Kωk ∈ Rr×m,∆ωk ∈ Sm+ , for k = 1, . . . , κ, and ∆ω0 ∈ R are derived in
Appendix B.1; and {xok} is the control-free process defined in (3.15) and
uok = uk +K
ω




Remark (Optimality of Linear Signaling Rules). Different from the cooper-
ative settings, (3.19) does not imply that the optimal transformed control
input is uok = −K
ω
k E{xok∣s1∶k} since sk depends on previous control inputs
u1∶k−1, as also pointed out in Chapter 2. Therefore, we cannot claim op-
timality of linear signaling rules within the general class of all measurable
policies.
However, for affine signaling rules, e.g., sk = L′k,kxk + . . . + L
′
k,1x1 + nk, we
have
E{xok∣L′1,1x1 +n1,⋯, L′k,kxk + . . . +L′k,1x1 +nk}
= E{xok∣L′1,1xo1 +n1,⋯, L′k,kxok + . . . +L′k,1xo1 +nk}, (3.21)
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which holds since the signal sl for l = 1, . . . , k can be written as
L′l,lxl+ . . . +L
′









+{L′l,lBul−1 + . . . + (L
′
l,lA
l−2 + . . . +L′l,2)Bu1}, (3.22)
where the term in-between {⋅} is σ-s1∶l−1 measurable since the control input
is given by (3.5). This yields that the optimal transformed control input is
given by uok = −K
ω
k E{xok∣s1∶k} since E{xok∣s1∶k} does not depend on u1∶k. Then,
the corresponding optimal (original) control input u∗k can be computed based
on (3.20) and u∗k is linear in E{xok∣s1∶k} while E{xok∣s1∶k} does not depend on
the type of the controller.
Remark (Versatility of the Control Objectives). The result in Step i) would
also hold if the controllers have objectives (other than (3.8)), e.g., additional
certain soft constraints, leading to optimal control inputs that are linear
functions of E{xok∣s1∶k}.
Due to the linearity of the controllers’ reactions in E{xok∣s1∶k}, the quadratic






pωVk(ω))} + vo, (3.23)
where V1∶κ(ω) ∈ Sm, for ω ∈ Ω, and vo ∈ R are derived in Appendix B.2.
Step ii) The covariance of the posterior control-free state Hk ∈ Sm can be
in-between two extremes: Σok corresponding to full disclosure of the state,
i.e., sk = xk; and E{E{xok∣s1∶k−1}E{xok∣s1∶k−1}′} = AHk−1A′ corresponding to
sharing nothing, i.e., sk = 0. The inequality
Σok ⪰Hk ⪰ AHk−1A
′ (3.24)
follows from the following covariance matrices:
cov{xok −E{xok∣s1∶k}} = Σok −Hk ⪰ O,
cov{E{xok∣s1∶k} −E{xok∣s1∶k−1}} =Hk −AHk−1A′ ⪰ O,
since for arbitrary random variables a and b,
E{aE{a∣b}} = E{E{a∣b}E{a∣b}}.
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We then arrive at (3.16) based on (3.24).
Step iii) In order to show (3.17), we will be using the following lemma
from [35] to address the cases when Σok −AΣ
o
k−1A
′ = Σw ⪰ O can be singular.
Lemma 3.2 (Lemma 3 in [35]). If we can partition a positive semi-definite
















⪰ O⇔ A ⪰ O and B = O. (3.25)
Based on Lemma 3.2, the following lemma shows that any point in Ψ can
be attained by a certain affine signaling rule.










































have the eigen-decomposition Tk = UkΛkU ′k with eigenvalues, e.g.,
4 λk,i ∈ [0,1]
for i = 1, . . . , tk, where tk = rank{Σok −ASk−1A
′}. Then, there exists a memo-
ryless affine signaling rule
yk = L
′
kxk +nk, for k = 1, . . . , κ, (3.27)
where nk ∼ N (0,Θk) and Θk = diag{θ21,1, . . . , θ
2
1,tk





















where Λok ∶= diag{λ
o








= λk,i ∈ [0,1],∀ i = 1. . . . , tk, (3.29)
4We do not assume that its eigenvalues are necessarily in [0,1]. But actually, they turn
out to be in [0,1].
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which leads to S1∶κ =H1∶κ.
Proof. The proof follows by induction. If S1∶κ ∈ Ψ, then S1 ∈ Sm satisfies
Σo1 ⪰ S1 ⪰ O, (3.30)

















Ū ′1 be the eigen-






























































be the corresponding partitioning. Note
that since Ū ′1S1Ū1 ⪰ O, we have M2,2 ⪰ O [62]. However, the bottom-right
block of the positive semi-definite matrix (the whole term) on the left-hand
side of the inequality (3.32), i.e., −M2,2, must also be a positive semi-definite
matrix, which implies O ⪰M2,2. Therefore we have M2,2 = O and Lemma 3.2






















Note that there exists a bijective relation between S1 ∈ Sm and T1 ∈ St1 .
Furthermore, (3.30) and (3.33) imply that
I ⪰ T1 ⪰ O, (3.34)
and T1 ∈ Sm has eigenvalues in the closed interval [0,1] since the eigenvalues
of I, i.e., the vector 1 ∈ Rt1 , weakly majorizes the eigenvalues of T1 from below
[62]. Let T1 = U1Λ1U ′1 be the eigen-decomposition and λ1,1, . . . , λ1,t1 ∈ [0,1]
be the associated eigenvalues.
Furthermore, consider the affine signaling rule s1 = L′1x1 +n1, where n1 ∼
N (0,Θ1) is independent of all the other parameters. Then, the covariance
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= λ1,i ∈ [0,1], for i = 1, . . . , t1, (3.37)
then, we would obtain H1 = S1 exactly.
Suppose that Hj = Sj for j < k. Then, Sk ∈ Sm satisfies
Σok ⪰ Sk ⪰ ASk−1A
′, (3.38)
which is equivalent to
Σok ⪰ Sk ⪰ AHk−1A
′. (3.39)
Correspondingly, Σok − AHk−1A
































⪰ Ū ′k(Sk −AHk−1A
′)Ūk ⪰ O (3.40)
and correspondingly Lemma 3.2 yields that there exists a symmetric matrix






















Furthermore, (3.39) and (3.41) yield that
I ⪰ Tk ⪰ O, (3.42)
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which implies that Tk ∈ Stk has eigenvalues in the closed interval [0,1]. Let
Tk = UkΛkU ′k be the eigen decomposition and λk,1, . . . , λk,tk ∈ [0,1] be the
associated eigenvalues.
Furthermore, for the affine signaling rule sk = L′kxk + nk, where nk ∼
N (0,Θk) is independent of all the other parameters, the covariance of the
posterior control-free state is given by
Hk = AHk−1A












+ cov{E{xok∣sk −E{sk∣s1∶k−1}}}, (3.45)
due to the independence of the jointly Gaussian s1∶k−1 and sk − E{sk∣s1∶k−1}.
























= λk,i ∈ [0,1], for i = 1, . . . , tk, (3.46)
then, we would obtain Hk = Sk exactly. Therefore, by induction, we conclude
that for any S1∶κ ∈ Ψ, there exists a certain affine signaling rule such that
Hk = Sk for k = 1, . . . , κ.
Remark (Memory vs. Memoryless). When PS has perfect measurements,
i.e., yk = xk, then the optimal signaling rules can be memoryless linear-
plus-noise policies within the general class of linear-plus-noise policies with
complete/bounded memory.
Lemma 3.3 implies the equality at (3.17), which completes the proof of
Theorem 3.1.
Henceforth, we will be working with the right-hand side of (3.16) instead
of its left-hand side while analyzing the equilibrium of the game G.
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and Ψ̄ ∈ Smκ be the set corresponding to the constraint set Ψ in this new high-
dimensional space, i.e., Rmκ×mκ. Furthermore, let Vi = V (ωi) and pi ∶= pωi ,
where i ∈ I and I is certain index set of the type set Ω.
Based on Theorem 3.1, at the Stackelberg equilibrium, where PS is the







piVi} + vo, (3.47)
since PA reacts to the committed signaling rule η1∶κ and correspondingly







piTr{SVi} + vo. (3.48)
The following proposition addresses the existence of an equilibrium for G.




∗(η1∶κ)) attaining the equilibrium of the Stack-
elberg game G, i.e., satisfying (3.12).
Proof. The proof follows from the equivalence at (3.16), which yields that
PS faces (3.48). Since the objective function in (3.48) is continuous in the
optimization arguments and the constraint sets are decoupled and compact,
the extreme value theorem and maximum theorem (showing the continuity of
parametric maximization under certain conditions [82]) yields the existence
of a solution to (3.48), which completes the proof.
Remark (Noisy vs. Noiseless Signals). The objective function in (3.48) is lin-
ear in the optimization argument S ∈ Ψ̄, and the constraint set Ψ̄ is compact
and convex. Therefore, given p ∈ ∆∣Ω∣, the solution could be attained at a







is convex in S ∈ Ψ̄ since the maximum of any family of linear functions is a












Tr{(µS + (1 − µ)S̄)∑
i
piVi} .
Therefore, the solution can be a non-extreme point of the constraint set
Ψ̄. Correspondingly, Lemma 3.3 implies that the optimal signals would be
affine in the underlying state rather than linear, i.e., there will be additional
independent noise term nk ∼ N (0,Θk), where Θk ≠ O.
Next, we seek to compute the equilibrium of G. To this end, we examine
the equilibrium conditions further. In particular, according to (3.48), given
S ∈ Ψ̄, the best action for PA is given by
p∗ ∈ {p ∈ ∆∣Ω∣ ∣pj = 0 if Tr{VjS} < max
i
Tr{ViS}} (3.50)
since (3.48) is linear in p ∈ ∆∣Ω∣. Then, based on the observation (3.50),
the following theorem provides an algorithm to compute the robust sensor
outputs.
Theorem 3.5 (Computing the Equilibrium). The value of the Stackelberg
equilibrium (3.48) is given by ϑ = minj∈I{ϑj}, where
ϑj ∶= min
S∈Ψ̄
Tr{VjS} + vo (3.51)
s.t. Tr{(Vj − Vi)S} ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
Furthermore, let ϑj∗ = ϑ and
S∗ ∈ argmin
S∈Ψ̄
Tr{Vj∗S} + vo (3.52)
s.t. Tr{(Vj∗ − Vi)S} ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
Then, given S∗ ∈ Ψ̄, the optimal signaling rule η1∶κ can be computed according
to Lemma 3.3.
Proof. Based on the existence result in Proposition 3.4, suppose that (S∗, p∗)
attains the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e., solves (3.48). Since p∗ ∈ ∆∣Ω∣, there
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must be at least one type with positive weight. As an example, suppose

























s.t. Tr{(Vj − Vi)S} ≥ 0 ∀i (3.56)
while the right-hand side is an SDP problem isolated from PA’s action. There-
fore, by searching over the index set I, we can compute the left-hand side,
which is the minimum over I. Once the minimum value is computed, S∗ can
be computed according to the corresponding index, i.e., (3.52).
Remark. In Theorem 3.5, we search over the index set I linearly, however,
certain pruning operations can be conducted to speed up the computation.
As an example, we can search over the extreme points of the convex hull of
Vj, j ∈ I.
Remark. There might be multiple solutions for (3.52). PS can be selective
among those solutions. In particular, (3.48) implies that PS minimizes the
cost given that PA maximizes it. Therefore, if the true underlying distribu-
tion is not the worst possible distribution, then PS would not get a cost more
than the anticipated one. Any deviation from the worst distribution benefits
PS. Furthermore, in the worst case, PA assigns positive probabilities to the
types leading to the maximum as in (3.50). Correspondingly, if PS selects
the solution S∗ ∈ Ψ̄ for (3.52) such that the cardinality of argmaxj Tr{VjS
∗}
is the smallest, then any positive probability on other types of attacks out of
that set would lead to lower cost and would be desirable.
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3.3 Noisy or Partial Measurements
In this section, we obtain the optimal signaling rule when there are noisy or
partial measurements of the type (3.2) by turning the problem to the same
structure with the case of perfect measurements based on a recent result
from [37] and then invoking the results from the previous section. There
are several challenges in robust sensor design with noisy or partial measure-
ments. As an example, the sufficiency result on the necessary conditions
for the covariance of the posterior control-free state, i.e., Hk, does not hold
in that case. Therefore, our focus will be on the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the covariance of the posterior control-free measurements, i.e.,
cov{E{yok∣s1∶k}}, where yok ∶= Cxok + vk. Similar to (3.21), we can show that
E{yok∣s1∶k} = E{yok∣so1∶k}, (3.57)








1 +nk, since u1∶k−1 is σ-y1∶k−1 measurable. How-






























































































which can also be written in a compact form as
yo1∶k = Aky
o
1∶k−1 + ek, (3.59)




by yo1∶k with some abuse of
notation.




1∶k form a Markov chain in the




1∶k. In that respect, the following lemma from [37] shows
that there exists a linear relation between the posterior estimates irrespective
of the signal if they are jointly Gaussian and form a Markov chain in a certain
order.
Lemma 3.6 ( [37]). Given zero-mean jointly Gaussian random vectors form-
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ing a Markov chain, e.g., x → y → s in this order, the posterior estimates of
x and y given s satisfy the following linear relation:
E{x∣s} = E{xy ′}E{yy ′}E{y ∣s}, (3.60)
which implies s → E{y ∣s}→ E{x∣s} in this order.






where Dk ∈ Rm×mk does not depend on the signaling rule η1∶k(⋅). We define
Yk ∶= cov{E{yo1∶k∣so1∶k}}. (3.62)













pωWk(ω))} + vo, (3.64)
where Wk(ω) ∶= D′kV (ω)Dk is also a symmetric matrix. Furthermore, con-
sider the following compact and convex set:
Φ ∶= {(Sk ∈ Smk)κk=1∣Σ
y
k ⪰ Sk ⪰ AkSk−1A
′
k, k = 1, . . . , κ, S0 = O}, (3.65)
where Σyk ∶= E{yo1∶k(yo1∶k)′}, C ∈ Rm×m and Σv ∈ Sm.
Remark. Note that Σyk ∈ Smk, Ak ∈ Rkm×(k−1)m, and Dk ∈ Rm×mk can be
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written as










































































in terms of Σo ∈ Smκ, defined in Appendix B.2 by (B.9).
Remark (Sufficiency Condition). Without loss of generality, suppose that
sk ∈ Rmk instead of sk ∈ Rm such that PS can disclose η̃k(y1∶k) = y1∶k with the
affine signaling rule η̃k(⋅) from Rmk to Rmk. Particularly, in practice, we can
always set the signaling rule ηk(⋅) from Rmk to Rm as
ηk(y1∶k) = E{xok∣η̃1(y1), . . . , η̃k(y1∶k)}. (3.66)
For such a signaling rule η̃k(⋅), by following similar lines in Step ii) in the
proof of Theorem 3.1, we can show that a necessary condition on Y1∶κ is that
Y1∶κ ∈ Φ. Furthermore, based on Lemma 3.3, a sufficient condition on Y1∶κ is
that for any S1∶κ ∈ Φ, there exists a certain signaling rule such that Y1∶κ = S1∶κ.
The following corollary to Theorem 3.1 provides an equivalent SDP prob-
lem (3.16) when there are noisy measurements.
Corollary 3.7 (Equivalence Result with Noisy or Partial Measurements).









Wk(ω))} + vo. (3.67)






Wk(ω))} + vo = US(η1∶κ,{γ
ω∗
1∶κ(η1∶κ)}ω∈Ω, p). (3.68)
Based on Corollary 3.7, the following corollary to Theorem 3.5 provides
an algorithm to compute the robust sensor outputs for the cases with noisy
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or partial measurements.
Corollary 3.8 (Computing the Equilibrium with Noisy or Partial Measure-







piTr{WiS} + vo, (3.69)




s.t. Tr{(Wj −Wi)S} ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.




s.t. Tr{(Wj∗ −Wi)S} ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
Given S∗ ∈ Φ̄, the optimal signaling rule η̃1∶κ can be computed according
to Theorem 3.1 with corresponding Σyk and Ak instead of Σ
o
k and A, for
k = 1, . . . , κ. Then, we can compute the actual signaling rules η1∶κ via (3.66).
3.4 Illustrative Examples
As numerical illustrations, we compare the performance of the proposed se-
cure sensor design framework with classical sensors that disclose the mea-
surement to the controller directly. The controller can have three different
types: type-ωo corresponding to benign controller, and type-α and type-β
corresponding to malicious controllers. As an illustrative example, we set
the time horizon κ = 10, the state’s dimension m = 4, and the control input’s
dimension r = 2. We consider that the state can be partitioned into the
separate processes {tk ∈ R2} and {zk ∈ R2}, i.e., x′k = [t′k z ′k], and the state































































































































Furthermore, we let the initial state x1 ∼ N (0,Σ1) and the state noise wk ∼













1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1.5 0
























1 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
0 0 0.98 −0.228













which implies {zk} is a stationary exogenous process. The benign controller























which implies that type-ωo controller and PS seek to regularize the controlled
process {tk} around the zero vector and the exogenous process {zk}. On the
other hand, the other malicious type controllers’ objectives are misaligned








Then, type-α PC seeks to regularize {t
(1)
k ∈ R} around zero and thus the










Type-β PC seeks to regularize the other component of tk, {t
(2)
k ∈ R}, again










We consider four different scenarios in terms of the measurements:
 Scenario-1: Perfect Measurements, i.e., yk = xk.
 Scenario-2: Noisy Measurements, i.e., yk = xk + vk.
 Scenario-3: Partial Measurements, i.e., yk = Cxk.
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 Scenario-4: Partial Noisy Measurements, i.e.,
yk = Cxk + vk.













1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1













which is a singular matrix. In Tables 3.1-3.4, we compare the performance
of the secure sensor design framework with the classical sensors in terms of









i.e., in terms of the impact of the sensor feedback and for the worst possible
distribution over the controllers’ types, based on Theorem 3.1 and Corollary
3.7 while V1∶κ(ω), for ω ∈ Ω, is derived in Appendix B.2.
Remark (Performance Metric). Note that the performance metric (3.75) ex-
cludes vo ∈ R from the original cost function (3.17) in perfect measurements
case or (3.68) in partial or noisy measurements case since vo ∈ R does not
depend on how the measurements have been shared with the controller, and
therefore is fixed for all the scenarios. Correspondingly, the performance met-
ric could be negative while the original cost function is always non-negative
by definition. △
Across Tables 3.1-3.4, i.e., across all Scenarios 1-4, we have the following
observations in common: i) the proposed framework outperforms the classical
sensors that disclose the (perfect or noisy) measurements directly without
any crafting; ii) the cost for the proposed framework and the classical full
disclosure strategy is the same when there is only benign type almost surely;
iii) the benign type PC is dominated by both type-α PC and type-β PC in
the worst distribution, i.e., benign type has zero probability almost surely in
the worst distribution; iv) type-β PC is stronger attacker than type-α PC by
leading to higher cost.
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Table 3.1: Scenario-1: Perfect Measurements. Comparison of the costs be-
tween secure sensor design and full information disclosure for the cases with
different sets of types. Note that lower cost is desirable.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type




















As seen in Table 3.1, in Scenario-1, the cost of the proposed framework
for all the cases, i.e., for different sets of types, is the smallest compared
to the other scenarios, where there can be partial or noisy measurements.
Particularly, the perfect measurements give the utmost freedom to PS to
select the signaling rule. Therefore, if there were any other case with partial
or noisy measurements, where PS achieves lower cost, then PS could have
selected that corresponding composed signaling rule in the case with perfect
measurement. Partial or noisy measurements limit PS’s ability to deceive
the attackers. Furthermore, we observe that when all the types can exist
with a positive probability, the cost is higher than the cases when only one
attacker exists. This yields that the worst distribution to defend against is
not dominated by the strongest attacker, who is type-β PC in this scenario.
In other words, the possibility of a mixture over the stronger and weaker
attackers can be more powerful.
In Scenarios 2 and 3, as seen in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, the performance de-
grades compared to Scenario 1 in the proposed framework. However, such
a performance degradation is not the case for the full information disclosure
in general. As an example, when there is only type-β PC almost surely, the
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Table 3.2: Scenario-2: Noisy Measurements. Comparison of the costs be-
tween secure sensor design and full information disclosure for the cases with
different sets of types.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type




















Table 3.3: Scenario-3: Partial Measurements. Comparison of the costs be-
tween secure sensor design and full information disclosure for the cases with
different sets of types.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type





















Table 3.4: Scenario-4: Partial Noisy Measurements. Comparison of the costs
between secure sensor design and full information disclosure for the cases
with different sets of types.
Almost-surely One Malicious
All Together
One Type with Benign Type




















cost is higher in Scenario 3 than the one in Scenario 1 for full disclosure of
the measurement. This is mainly because the objectives of the malicious
type controller is not the complete opposite of the benign type controller.
Therefore, even though in all the cases illustrated in this section, we have
observed that there can even be examples, where the full disclosure of the
measurement can lead to a positive cost, which would imply that disclos-
ing even no information with the controller would lead to lower cost, i.e.,
0, since no information disclosure yields that the covariance of the posterior
control-free state is Hk = O. Furthermore, we observe that the possibility of
a mixture over the stronger and weaker attackers can also be more powerful
in Scenarios 2 and 3.
In Scenario-4, as seen in Table 3.4, the cost for the case when there is
only the benign type is the highest. However, while the costs for the cases
when there is only type-α attacker is higher than the corresponding cases
in Scenario-2, the costs for the cases when there is only type-β attacker is
lower than the corresponding cases in Scenario-2. Note that type-β attacker
is still stronger than type-α attacker by leading to higher cost. Furthermore,
the costs for the case when all the types can exist with a positive probability
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also leads to a similar twist, where we observe a higher cost in Scenario-
2. We also note that type-β attacker dominates the worst distribution over
all the types since the costs for the case where there is only type-β is the
same with the cost for the case when there are all types. Therefore, we
can conclude that depending on the type of controllers and how informative
the measurements are, the costs can vary in a complicated way while the
proposed framework provides the optimal way to compute the robust sensor
outputs and a performance assessment tool for, e.g., various sensor placement
techniques.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have proposed and addressed the robust sensor design
problem for cyber-physical systems with linear Gaussian dynamics against
multiple advanced and evasive attackers with quadratic control objectives.
By designing sensor outputs cautiously in advance, we have sought to deceive
the attackers about the underlying state of the system so that they would
act/attack to the system in-line with the normal operation. Our goal has
been to exploit the aligned part between the attackers’ and the system’s
objectives so that the attackers would only have fulfilled the aligned part by
crafting the information available to them. To this end, we have modeled
the problem formally in a game-theoretical hierarchical setting, where the
advanced attackers can be aware of the designed signaling rules.
We have formulated an equivalent problem to the problem faced by the
sensor against any attacker with a known objective. This new problem was
an SDP problem. We have introduced additional linear constraints on that
equivalent problem and provided an SDP algorithm to compute the opti-
mal robust sensor design strategies against multiple types of attackers. We
have also extended the results to scenarios where the sensor could have ac-
cess to partial or noisy measurements of the underlying state. Finally, we
have examined the performance of the proposed framework across various
scenarios and compared with the classical sensor outputs that disclose the
measurements directly without any crafting.
Some future directions of research on this topic include formulation of
secure sensor design strategies for robust control of systems, and considering
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scenarios where the attackers can have side information about the underlying
state, which would limit the sensor’s ability to deceive the attackers. Another
interesting research direction would be the application of the framework to
sensor placement or sensor selection. Furthermore, even though we have
motivated the framework by relating it to security, the framework could also
address strategic information disclosure over multi-agent control networks





There are two ways to induce a person to do something. One is
to provide incentives, by which we mean anything which changes
marginal utility–explicit payments, coercion, or supply of comple-
mentary goods. The other is to persuade, by which we mean any-
thing which changes beliefs.
– Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow [15]
To induce intelligent decision makers to take certain actions, we can cre-
ate incentives via external means, e.g., explicit payments, but we can also
persuade them to take the actions by their own will without the need for
any external means if we can craft the information available to them [15]. In
informed (rational) decisions, understanding of how the information is gen-
erated plays an essential role. Without such an understanding, rationality
necessitates the consideration of who generates the information. For exam-
ple, if the objectives of the information provider and the decision maker are
known to be misaligned, then the rational decision maker should take into
account that the (selfish) information provider must have generated the in-
formation in a way that manipulates the decision. Such a problem of interest
was originally introduced and analyzed by Crawford and Sobel in their inau-
gural paper [4]. They have considered the scenarios where the information
of interest is drawn from a compact state space according to a commonly
known distribution. When the (quite general) cost measures of the players
are misaligned by a commonly known bias term, the authors have drawn
the conclusion that in any incentive compatible, i.e., Nash, equilibrium, the
information provider partitions the state space in a certain way and then
signals the partition of the information realized.
On the other hand, if how the information/signal is generated is trans-
parent to the decision maker, the decision maker would just follow the (non-
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strategic) machinery of the Bayesian reaction. Correspondingly, transparency
of the signals sent gives more power to the information provider seeking to
control the rational reaction of the decision maker. This brings in the possi-
bility of persuading intelligent decision makers to take certain actions through
transparent information transmissions. One way to ensure transparency is
the commitment power of the information provider. Relatively recently, such
a problem of interest has been examined by Kamenica and Gentzkow in their
seminal paper [15]. They have considered the scenarios where the decision
maker is aware of the content of the messages received due to the committed
transparency/honesty even though the information provider may not reveal
the underlying information completely. They have provided a geometrical
interpretation of the optimal persuasive signaling strategy and examined the
persuasion capability of the information provider. A detailed justification
of the information provider’s commitment power can be found in [15] and a
recent survey of literature on Bayesian persuasion could be found in [21].
In this chapter, we are also interested in the signaling models with policy
commitment. As a special subclass1 of the Bayesian persuasion framework,
here the information provider is interested in the perception of the decision
maker about the underlying information of interest with respect to some
quadratic cost measure rather than any decision made (possibly) based on
that perception. Without loss of generality, we incorporate the commitment
power of the information provider via a hierarchical structure where the infor-
mation provider leads the interaction from a hierarchically higher position by
announcing his/her signaling strategies publicly. This hierarchical viewpoint
enables us to examine the interaction between the information provider and
the decision maker under the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium [3],
where the information provider is the leader.
We note that hierarchical signaling could have important applications in
multi-agent noncooperative environments since asymmetry of information
that agents have access to is prevalent due to the diversity of the agents’ per-
spectives. For example, distributed signal processing over sensor networks
seeks to exploit this diversity through information exchanges among cooper-
ative sensors in order to broaden their horizons (e.g., see [83]). However, in
a noncooperative environment, selfish agents could have incentive to share
1We name this sub-class “hierarchical signaling” to distinguish it from general Bayesian
persuasion.
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the information private to them strategically with the other agents in order
to gain advantage with respect to their own distinct objective. Correspond-
ingly, as argued in [84], commitment/transparency could play an important
role for the credibility of the agents on the long run. Furthermore, in ad-
versarial environments, commitment of the defender could be viewed as the
defender avoiding the vulnerability of obscurity based defense against the
possibility that the attacker could have learned the defense strategy, e.g., via
regression analysis, once it is deployed widely.
Prior Literature Originating in the fields of economics, recently, strate-
gic signaling has also attracted significant attention in the fields of commu-
nication and control due to its compelling applications in noncooperative
multi-agent environments. Due to the versatility of Gaussian distribution
in engineering applications, these studies have mainly focused on Gaussian
information models, different from the literature in the economics.
Within the framework of [4], in [29], the authors have identified the con-
dition under which a non-partition equilibrium can exist in the scenarios
where the underlying information is Gaussian, there exists an additive Gaus-
sian noise channel, the players have quadratic cost measures, and the infor-
mation provider has a soft power constraint on the signal sent. Under the
solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium, in [31], the authors have studied
the problem setting of [4] when the misalignment factor between the objec-
tives of the information provider and the decision maker, i.e., the bias term,
is private to the information provider. They have shown that the optimal
signaling strategy is linear in the scenarios where the underlying informa-
tion is (multivariate) Gaussian, the players have quadratic cost measures,
and the decision maker has bounded rationality by using linear estimates
only. Indeed, for the same settings of [31], in [22], the author had shown
that the optimal signaling strategy is linear even when the decision maker is
completely rational by selecting any measurable decision policy and provided
an analytical formulation of the optimal signaling strategy. Under the same
settings with [31] yet for a completely rational receiver and scalar Gaussian
information, [30] has shown the optimality of linear signaling strategies when
there is an additive Gaussian noise channel and the information provider has
a hard power constraint.
In the earlier chapters, we have addressed hierarchical Gaussian signaling
in non-cooperative dynamic communication and control systems over a finite
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horizon. For discrete-time (multivariate) Gauss-Markov processes, in Chap-
ter 2, we have shown the optimality of linear signaling strategies within the
general class of measurable policies and formulated an equivalent (in opti-
mality) semi-definite program (SDP), which enables computation of the opti-
mal signaling strategies numerically through existing SDP solvers efficiently.
In [42], we have shown that the equivalence to an SDP is not limited to
equivalence in optimality and would still hold when we include certain addi-
tional constraints in the optimization. In that way, for non-cooperative linear
quadratic Gaussian control problems, we have addressed in Chapter 3 opti-
mal linear signaling strategies of a sensor who seeks to deceive a private-type
controller in settings where the distribution over the types of the controller
is not known.
For Gaussian information, we can obtain well structured results, e.g., lin-
ear signaling strategies, also in dynamic and noisy environments, as shown in
the studies reviewed above. However, for distributions other than Gaussian,
we still have significant but yet not completely explored problems. Notably,
for general distributions with compact support, [15] brings in a geometrical
interpretation into the problem, which requires the computation of a con-
vex envelope of a function, which can be prominently challenging even for
finite yet relatively large state spaces [85]. We also note that, as studied
in [86–88], a relatively simpler characterization of the solution is possible for
a special class of Bayesian persuasion problems, which is different from our
problem settings. There have also been computational approaches for the
Bayesian persuasion problem, e.g., [89, 90]. Particularly, the non-strategic
nature of the decision maker makes it possible to formulate the problem as a
single optimization problem faced by the information provider. Based on the
revelation principle, the authors formulate a linear program to compute the
optimal signaling strategy, which, however, turns out to be impractical to
solve numerically unless the finite state space is fairly small [89, 90]. There-
fore the authors consider the scenarios where the players’ cost measures are
independently (and identically) drawn from a known distribution for each
state, and examine connections with auction theory. We also note that for
such an LP formulation, the action space of the receiver is considered to be
finite, however, in our setting, the receiver’s decision is his/her belief and cor-
respondingly his/her action space is a continuum even when the underlying
information is discrete.
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Contributions of This Chapter In this chapter, our goal is to address
hierarchical signaling for a general class of square integrable multivariate
distributions. We again consider the scenario where there are two decision
makers: a sender and a receiver. The sender has access to the realizations
of two random vectors (with commonly known statistical profiles): informa-
tion of interest and some private information. The receiver seeks to estimate
the information of interest in the mean-square-error sense based on the sig-
nal he/she receives. To this end, the receiver seeks to compute the optimal
Bayesian (possibly nonlinear) estimate of the information of interest using
the signal he/she receives. However, the sender constructs the signal strate-
gically in a stochastic way in order to deceive the receiver to perceive the
information of interest as that private information with respect to another
quadratic cost measure. The sender selects the signaling strategy from the
general class of stochastic kernels. Furthermore, by turning the problem
around, the proposed setting could also be applicable to preserve privacy.
While sharing the information of interest, the sender could seek to minimize
the informational leakage of the private information when the information of
interest and the private information are not independent of each other. Al-
though we mainly focus on the former, i.e., deceptive signaling, problem, we
will also show how the results would be extended to the latter, i.e., persuasive
privacy, problem.
Under the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium, where the sender
is the leader, we seek to compute the least possible cost for the sender at
an equilibrium. Note that a Stackelberg game admits a unique value for the
leader at all the equilibria if they exist. Particularly, the follower reacts in a
non-strategic way given the leader’s strategy. Correspondingly, we can for-
mulate the problem faced by the leader as a “single” optimization problem by
characterizing the follower’s non-strategic reaction. In other words, the com-
mitment power of the sender brings the signaling problem into the domain
of optimization instead of fixed-point analysis as in the incentive compatible
models, e.g., [4].
For any signaling strategy, the optimal reaction of the receiver is given by
the conditional expectation of the information of interest, where the condi-
tioning is on the signal sent by the sender. We note that in general, it is
challenging to obtain the conditional expectation in an analytical form for
arbitrary joint statistical profiles of the signal and the information of interest.
79
Therefore, we seek to examine the problem faced by the sender further in
order to transform it into a structured, exploitable, form. As shown in [22],
the problem faced by the sender turns out to be a linear function of the
correlation matrix of the posterior estimate. We note that the relationship
between the correlation matrix of the posterior estimate and the signaling
strategies is highly nonlinear. However, by characterizing tractable necessary
and sufficient conditions on the correlation matrix of the posterior estimate
enables us to compute the minimum cost for the sender. In [42], we have
shown that for Gaussian distributions, the necessary and sufficient condition
on the correlation matrix of the posterior can be expressed via certain linear
matrix inequalities while these linear matrix inequalities are not sufficient for
the general class of distributions. This is another intriguing feature of Gaus-
sian distribution which provides the sender with utmost flexibility to deceive
the receiver within the general class of square integrable distributions with
fixed mean and covariance.
As an initial step toward addressing the problem for arbitrary distribu-
tions, we first consider discrete distributions. Although, now, the problem
is a finite-dimensional optimization problem, obtaining its solution is still
challenging due to its highly nonlinear and non-convex nature. One of our
contributions in this chapter is to transform this challenging problem into a
structured, exploitable, form. To this end, we formulate an equivalent linear
optimization problem over the convex cone of completely positive matrices.
We say that a matrix Ξ ∈ Rn×n is completely positive if there exists an (entry-
wise) non-negative matrix B ∈ Rn×k+ such that Ξ = BB′ [91]. Even though it
is a linear optimization problem, the cone of completely positive matrices is
still not tractable [91]. Furthermore, the proof of equivalence is constructive
yet requires the factorization of a completely positive matrix (see [92, 93]).
Notably this cone turns out to be tractable for sizes up to 4 [91,94].
On the other hand, the dual of the equivalent problem is a linear optimiza-
tion problem over the cone of copositive matrices. We say that a symmetric
matrix A ∈ Sn is copositive provided that b′Ab ≥ 0 for all b ∈ Rn+ [91]. We can
show that the strong duality is attained for our problem setting. We note
that some classes of NP-hard problems could be transformed into copos-
itive programs [95]. It is an active research area to exploit the compact
structure of the cone of copositive matrices to approximate the underlying
constraint space with sequential polyhedral or semi-definite cones for any
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accuracy level at the expense of computational complexity, e.g., [95–100].
Therefore, by transforming the hierarchical signaling problem into this class
of problems, we can benefit from these powerful computational tools devel-
oped (or to be developed) in the optimization community over the course of
time. We examine the approximation power of the proposed solution concept
given a discretization of a continuous distribution via, e.g., a quantization
scheme [101]. We also formulate an upper bound on the approximation error
in terms of the quantization error. Finally, we examine the performance of
the proposed solution concept over various numerical examples.
We can list the main contributions of this chapter as follows:
 We address the problem of optimal hierarchical signaling to deceive
a receiver to perceive the underlying information of interest as some
private information for a general class of distributions.
 We show that the proposed solution concept also works for privacy
applications where a sender seeks to minimize the informational leakage
on his/her private information while sharing the information of interest
with the receiver.
 For discrete distributions, we formulate an equivalent linear optimiza-
tion problem over the convex cone of completely positive matrices and
show its strong duality with a linear optimization problem over the
convex cone of copositive matrices. This equivalence enables us to use
the existing computational tools [95–97] to solve this class of problems
at any level of accuracy.
 We formulate an upper bound on the error of approximation if we use
the proposed solution concept for a discretized version of the underlying
continuous distribution, e.g., via a quantization scheme.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1, we formulate the de-
ceptive signaling game for the general class of continuous distributions. In
Section 4.2, we compute the optimal signaling strategy for finite state spaces
by formulating an equivalent linear optimization problem over the cone of
completely positive matrices, and examine the loss induced if we use the pro-
posed solution concept for a discretized version of a continuous state space.
In Section 4.3, we discuss the computational approaches to solve the equiva-













Figure 4.1: Hierarchical signaling model, where a sender has access to some
information of interest as well as private information, and sends a signal com-
posed of them to a receiver while the receiver seeks to learn the information
of interest. The receiver will be learning both of them while the sender seeks
to induce the receiver to perceive the information of interest as the private
information.
examples. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter with several remarks and possi-
ble research directions.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Consider two non-cooperating decision makers: a sender (PS) and a receiver
(PR), as seen in Fig. 4.1. PS has access to an underlying information of
interest and also to some private information, which are realizations of m-
dimensional random vectors x and y with supports X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rm,
respectively. The supports are not necessarily compact and can be as large as
the entire Rm, e.g., the support of a multivariate Gaussian distribution. The
random variables are defined on a common probability space (Ω,F ,P), where









where Bm denotes the Borel σ-algebra on Rm. We note that explicit definition
of the probability space does not play a role in the analysis. We consider the
scenarios where x and y belong to the normed space of all square integrable
m-dimensional random vectors with the norm: ∥x∥ = E{x′x}1/2.
PS selects his2 strategy π(⋅) as a “stochastic kernel” from X ×Y to S ⊂ R2m
such that the signal sent is given by
s = π(x,y), a.e. over S. (4.3)
Let us denote the set of all such signaling rules by Π, i.e., π ∈ Π. On the
other side, after a realization of the signal sent is received, PR selects her
strategy γ(⋅) that is a Borel measurable function from S to X such that her
estimate of the underlying information is given by
x̂ = γ(s), a.e. over X . (4.4)
The strategy space of PR is denoted by Γ, which is the set of all measurable
functions from S to X .
The decision makers select their strategies according to distinct cost mea-
sures. PR has the cost measure
cR(π, γ) = ∥x − x̂∥
2 (4.5)
to be minimized via γ ∈ Γ, i.e., seeks to estimate the underlying information
of interest. On the other side, PS has the cost measure
cS(π, γ) = ∥y − x̂∥
2 (4.6)
to be minimized via π ∈ Π, i.e., seeks to induce PR to perceive the information
of interest as the private information instead of true itself.
We consider a hierarchical setting where PR makes a Bayes estimate of the
information of interest based on the signal received by knowing the content
of the signal, i.e., the signaling rule π ∈ Π. Correspondingly, we model the
interaction between the decision makers under the solution concept of Stack-
elberg equilibrium [3], where PS is the leader, who commits and announces
2We use the pronouns “he” and “she” while referring to PS and PR, respectively, only
for clear referral.
83
to play his strategy beforehand, while PR is the follower, who selects her
strategy knowing PS’s strategy. In particular, we can view the sequence of
moves as follows:
1. PS selects π ∈ Π according to (4.6) and by anticipating the optimal
response of PR.
2. PR observes the signaling rule chosen by PS and selects γ ∈ Γ according
to (4.5).
3. Nature chooses the outcome ω ∈ Ω, and correspondingly x = x(ω),
y = y(ω), and s = s(ω), which is s(ω) = π(x(ω),y(ω)).
4. PR observes the realization s ∈ S.
5. PR estimates x ∈ X given s ∈ S via γ ∈ Γ.
Note that we can view the estimate of x ∈ X as a realization of the ran-
dom vector x̂, as described in (4.4). In the following, we provide a formal
description of this game.
Definition (Deceptive Signaling Game). The deceptive signaling game
G ∶= (Π,Γ,x,y, cS(⋅), cR(⋅)) (4.7)
is a Stackelberg game between the leader PS and the follower PR. We let
B(π) ⊂ Γ be the optimum reaction set of the follower PR for a given strategy
π ∈ Π of PS. Then, the pair of the strategy and the optimum reaction set









Note that different from the previous literature on Bayesian persuasion,
here PS considers the scenarios where PR breaks the tie in the reverse di-
rection of PS’s favor, which would be more justifiable given the deceptive
intention of PS. However, in our case, due to the strictly convex cost mea-
sure of PR, the best reaction set of PR for any given signaling strategy π ∈ Π
will already turn out to be a singleton with probability 1.
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We also note that we can turn the problem around by considering different
quadratic cost measures so that the proposed solution concept could also have
applications for, e.g., privacy, as long as the cost measures are quadratic and
PR’s optimum reaction turns out to be the mean of the posterior estimate. In
that respect, we introduce the “persuasive privacy” problem, where PS and
PR have a contract dictating PS to disclose the information of interest x, but
following the contract, PS also seeks to control the perception of PR about the
private information y since PR could infer the private information based on
the signal sent. Correspondingly, if x and y are not completely independent of
each other, direct disclosure of x could reveal y to a certain extent. Therefore,
PS might seek to preserve such leakage of private information by signaling to
PR strategically. For example, we might view PR seeking to estimate both x
and y based on the signal s = πp(x,y). To this end, PR selects decision rules
γpx ∶ X → X and γ
p
y ∶ Y → Y that minimize
cpR(π
p, γp) = ∥x − γpx(π
p(x,y))∥2 + ∥y − γpy(π
p(x,y))∥2,
where γp ∶= (γpx, γ
p
y) ∈ Γp and Γp denotes the space of such decision rule pairs.
On the other side, PS constructs the signal s via a signaling rule πp ∈ Π to
minimize
cpS(π
p, γp) = ∥x − γpx(π
p(x,y))∥2 − ∥y − γpy(π
p(x,y))∥2.
We note that the sign of the second term in the cost measure of PR is positive
since PR seeks to estimate the private information y, whereas the sign of the
second term in the cost measure of PS is negative since PS seeks to maximize
the estimation error of PR for the private information.
Similar to the description of the deceptive signaling game G, in the follow-
ing, we provide a formal description of this “persuasive privacy” game.
Definition (Persuasive Privacy Game). The persuasive privacy game
Gp ∶= (Π,Γp,x,y, cpS(⋅), c
p
R(⋅)) (4.9)
is a Stackelberg game between the leader PS and the follower PR. The
pair of the strategy and the optimum reaction set (πp,Bp(πp)) attains the
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In the following, we mainly address the deceptive signaling game G while
remarking how the results would also be applicable for the persuasive privacy
game Gp.
4.2 Main Result
Before delving into the technical details, in the following we first provide an
overview of the main result of this chapter and the steps we follow toward its
solution. We first focus on identifying the underlying optimization problem
faced by PS. Note that PR follows the machinery of Bayesian estimation for
any signaling rule selected/committed by PS. By incorporating this (non-
strategic) machinery into PS’s cost measure (4.6), we can write the optimal
hierarchical signaling problem as a single optimization problem faced by PS.
Before addressing the problem for the general class of distributions, we
seek to address the problem for finite state spaces. This will also enable us
to formulate the best achievable performance for PS approximately for con-
tinuous distributions if we discretize them via, e.g., a quantization scheme.
Although the problem faced by PS is no longer an infinite-dimensional op-
timization problem when the underlying state space is finite, the problem
turns out to be a highly nonlinear and non-convex optimization problem. To
mitigate this issue, we formulate an equivalent linear optimization problem
over the cone of completely positive matrices. Although this problem is a
linear optimization problem, which has compact structure, because of the
underlying constraint space, i.e., the cone of completely positive matrices,
it is not tractable and indeed some classes of NP-hard problems could be
transformed into this form [91]. The difficulty of this equivalent problem is
also a formal indication of the difficulty level for the original optimization
problem. In other words, a polynomial-time solution for the hierarchical sig-
naling problem would have implied a polynomial-time solution for a large
class of completely positive programs.
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Furthermore, the dual of the equivalent problem is a linear optimization
problem over the cone of copositive matrices, and we can show that the
strong duality is attained for our problem setting. However, this cone is
also not tractable, but its compact structure enables us to approximate the
underlying constraint space with sequential polyhedral or semi-definite cones
for any level of accuracy at the expense of computational complexity [95–
97]. Therefore, by transforming the hierarchical signaling problem into this
form, we can use these existing computational tools. In order to extend the
results to continuous distributions, we examine the approximation error on
the cost metric of PS when the underlying distribution is discretized via a
given quantization scheme. In the following, we provide the technical details.
4.2.1 Optimization Problem Faced by PS
Since PR’s objective is a mean-square-error minimization problem, as de-
scribed in (4.5), it is well known that the best reaction of PR, for any given
signaling rule π ∈ Π, is uniquely given by x̂ = E{x∣s} almost everywhere over
X . Consider the augmented vector z ∶= [x′ y ′]
′
composed of the information
of interest x and the private information y. We denote the support of z by
Z ∶= X ×Y and define ẑ ∶= E{z ∣s} almost everywhere over Z. Henceforth we
will call ẑ “posterior” instead of posterior estimate of the augmented vector.
Through this new auxiliary parameter, we can write the problem faced by
PS in a compact form. To this end, let the optimum reaction of PR for a
committed signaling strategy π ∈ Π be denoted by γ∗(π) so that we can show
its dependence on π explicitly. Then the problem faced by PS, as defined in
(4.6), can be written as
cS(π, γ


















since we have E{zẑ ′} = E{E{zẑ ′∣s}} = E{ẑẑ ′}.
Remark. In the persuasive privacy game Gp, the optimum reaction of PR
would be γpx(s) = E{x∣s}, almost everywhere over X , and γpy(s) = E{y ∣s},
almost everywhere over Y. Correspondingly, the problem faced by PS could
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be written in that case as
cpS(π


















The following results are also applicable to Gp if we simply replace V ∈ S2m
by V p ∈ S2m.




Tr{V E{ẑẑ ′}} , (4.15)
where we have taken the first term at the right-hand side of (4.11) out of
the optimization objective since Tr{E{yy ′}} has a fixed value, i.e., does not
depend on the optimization argument π ∈ Π. Furthermore, the problem faced
by PS depends on the optimization argument π ∈ Π only via3 E{ẑẑ ′} while
the optimization objective is linear in E{ẑẑ ′}. This motivates us to examine
the relation between the correlation matrix of the posterior E{ẑẑ ′} and the
signaling rule π ∈ Π further.
Instead of attempting the problem as direct optimization on the strategy
space of PS, we seek to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions
on the correlation matrix of the posterior estimate. Note that the opti-
mization objective (4.15) depends on the (infinite-dimensional) optimization
argument π ∈ Π only through a (finite-dimensional) matrix corresponding
to the correlation matrix of the posterior estimate of the underlying infor-
mation. By exploiting the relation between the signaling strategies and the
correlation matrix of the posterior estimate, we seek to obtain a tractable
finite-dimensional problem equivalent to the original infinite-dimensional op-
timization problem. This has already been shown to be possible via a linear
optimization problem with tractable constraints, e.g., linear matrix inequal-
ities, for the special class of Gaussian distributions [22,42]. In [42], however,
we have also shown that this finite-dimensional problem can only be viewed
as a lower bound (indeed not a tight one) for the general class of distributions.
3Information drawn from square integrable distributions ensures that E{ẑẑ ′} is well
defined.
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4.2.2 An Equivalent Problem over the Cone of Completely
Positive Matrices
In order to address (4.8) in the most general form, let us first focus on
the special case where n ∶= ∣Z ∣ < ∞. Recall that the geometrical approach
developed in [15] can be used effectively for finite state spaces with fairly small
sizes, while the geometrical approach developed in [86] can be effectively used
for relatively larger size problems if the problem faced by PS only depends
on the mean of the posterior. Therefore the solution for (4.8) has remained
open even for finite state spaces since here the problem faced by PS depends
on the correlation matrix of the posterior. Further, by addressing (4.8) for
finite state spaces at large scales brings in the possibility of addressing (4.8)
approximately for continuum state spaces.
Taking the state space to be finite, we can restrict ourselves to the scenarios
where n ≤ k ∶= ∣S ∣ <∞ without loss of generality. In the web appendix of [15],
the authors have shown that the size of the signal space can be set the
same with the size of the state space, i.e., k = n, without loss of generality.
However, we do not impose such an upper bound on k. We can view the
signaling strategy selected by PS as if PS selects a mixed strategy over S for
each z ∈ Z, i.e., determines the probabilities of sending the signals in S. With
a slight abuse of notation, we denote the probability that PS sends s ∈ S for
z ∈ Z by π(s∣z) ∈ [0,1]. Note that for each z ∈ Z, PS will be sending a signal
with probability 1, which yields that
∑
s∈S
π(s∣z) = 1. (4.16)
Note that null signaling, i.e., sending no signal, does not lead to a contradic-
tion since it can practically be viewed as sending the same signal for all the
states. Suppose that the prior distribution has complete support on Z and
let po(z) ∈ (0,1] denote the probability that the state z ∈ Z is realized. Then
Bayes rule yields that the probability of state z ∈ Z being realized given that





4A signal s ∈ S would be received if the associated probability is positive, i.e., p(s) > 0.
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Therefore, for given s ∈ S, we have












We can write the correlation matrix of the posterior (4.20) in a compact
form as
E{ẑẑ ′} = ZΞπZ ′, (4.21)
where Z ∶= [z1 . . . zn] ∈ R2m×n and we introduce Ξπ ∈ Sn whose ith row and




Then, the problem faced by PS can be written as
min
π∈Π
Tr{E{ẑẑ ′}V } = min
π∈Π
Tr{ΞπV̄ } , (4.23)
where V̄ ∶= Z ′V Z.
Remark. We can address the problem according to the solution concept de-
veloped in [15] as follows. The cost for PS if PR has the posterior belief
p ∈ ∆(Z) is given by
ĉ(p) = Tr{V̄ pp′} (4.24)
since ẑ = Zp for the posterior belief p ∈ ∆(Z) and correspondingly we have
E{ẑẑ ′} = Zpp′Z ′. Then, the solution concept says that the minimum cost
for PS is attained at C(po), where C(p) is the convex envelope of ĉ(p), i.e.,
C(p) ≡ inf{c∣(p, c) ∈ co{ĉ}}, (4.25)
where co{ĉ} denotes the convex hull of the graph of ĉ. However, V ∈ S2m
90
(or V p ∈ S2m), as described in (4.12) (or in (4.14)), has both positive and
negative eigenvalues, which yields that the function ĉ is neither convex nor
concave. This makes the computation of the convex envelope prominently
challenging. Therefore, we develop a new solution concept.
The following proposition provides a compact characterization of a neces-
sary and sufficient condition on Ξπ.
Proposition 4.1. For any signaling rule π ∈ Π, Ξπ ∈ Sn, as described in
(4.22), satisfies Ξπ ∈ CP
n and Ξπ1 = po, where po ∶= [po(z1) . . . po(zn)]
′
.
Furthermore for any completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn that satisfies
Ξ1 = p
o
, there exists a signaling rule π ∈ Π such that Ξπ = Ξ. Consider




i, where bi ∈ Rn+. Then, the






, ∀ i = 1, . . . , k, j = 1, . . . , n, (4.26)
where bi,j ≥ 0 denotes the jth entry of bi.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C.1.
Remark. We note that a necessary condition on E{ẑẑ ′} is given by [42]
E{zz ′} ⪰ E{ẑẑ ′} ⪰ E{z}E{z}′ , (4.27)
which corresponds to
E{zz ′} ⪰ ZΞπZ ′ ⪰ E{z}E{z}′ . (4.28)
However, given the necessary and sufficient condition that Ξπ ∈ CP
n and
Ξπ1 = po, this condition (4.28) turns out to be redundant.
Based on Proposition 4.1, the following corollary shows that the highly
nonlinear non-convex optimization problem faced by PS could be written,
“equivalently”, as a linear optimization problem over the convex cone of
completely positive matrices. We emphasize that there is no relaxation on
the optimization problem and the equivalence is not limited to optimality.
5A completely positive matrix could have multiple different factorization even for the
same k ∈ N [92]. This also yields that the corresponding signaling strategy is not unique
in general.
6Note that the prior distribution has complete support over Z by definition.
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Tr{E{ẑẑ ′}V } = min
Ξ∈CPn
Tr{ΞV̄ } , (4.29)
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
where V̄ = Z ′V Z.
Interestingly, the following proposition shows that the equivalent problem,
as described by the right-hand side of (4.29) turns out to be a semi-definite
program (SDP), which can be solved with the existing numerical tools/solvers
efficiently if n ≤ 4.
Proposition 4.3. Let n ≤ 4. Then, we have
minΞ∈CPn Tr{ΞV̄ } = minΞ∈Sn+ Tr{ΞV̄ } .
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o




Furthermore, an SDP relaxation of the problem for n > 4 is given by
minΞ∈CPn Tr{ΞV̄ } ≥ minΞ∈Sn+ Tr{ΞV̄ } .
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o




Proof. This follows since CPn ⊆ Sn+ ∩Rn×n+ for all n, while CPn = Sn+ ∩Rn×n+ if,
and only if, n ≤ 4 [91,94].
With respect to the trace inner product, given the primal problem:
min
Ξ∈CPn
Tr{ΞV̄ } , s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
, (4.32)





y, s.t. 1y′ − S = V̄ . (4.33)
Furthermore, the following proposition shows the strong duality between
(4.32) and (4.33), which enables us to solve only one of them while obtaining
the value of both of them.
Proposition 4.4. The primal problem (4.32) is feasible, has finite value,
and has an interior point. Therefore, there exists a strong duality between
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the primal problem (4.32) and its dual (4.33), i.e., we have
minΞ∈CPn Tr{ΞV̄ } = maxy∈Rn,S∈COPn p′oy.
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
s.t. 1y′ − S = V̄
(4.34)
Proof. We can show that there exists an interior point in the feasible set of
the optimization problem based on the characterization of the interior of CPn
provided in [102]. Particularly, a mixture of full and null signaling leads to
Ξπ ∈ int{CP
n
} and Ξπ1 = po. The technical details of the proof is provided
in Appendix C.2.
4.2.3 Theoretical Approximation Guarantees
We have formulated the minimum cost of PS for the scenarios where the
state space is finite. We can, however, adopt the solution concept to the
general class of distributions by discretizing a continuous state space through
a quantization scheme. However, such discretization would lead to loss of
information and correspondingly the computed minimum cost could deviate
from the true one. Therefore, in this subsection, we seek to restrain this
deviation. To this end, by turning the problem around, we can view the
problem setting as PS selecting a random vector within the general class
of square integrable distributions and sending a realization of that signal
rather than selecting a signaling strategy within the general class of stochastic
kernels. Note that PS should take into account the joint distribution of the
underlying distribution and the signal sent, which would normally have been
determined by the signaling strategy.
Based on this observation, the following corollary provides theoretical guar-
antees on the approximation capability of the solution concept for a given
quantization scheme.
Corollary 4.5. Consider a quantization of the continuous random variable
z ∈ Z, denoted by zq ∈ Z, i.e., zq attains the same value within any bin
of the quantization. Let e = z − zq, almost everywhere over Z, denote the
quantization error. Then, we have
∣min
s
Tr{E{ẑẑ ′}V } −min
s
Tr{E{ẑqẑ ′q}V }∣ ≤ ε, (4.35)
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where ẑ = E{z ∣s}, ẑq = E{zq ∣s}, and
ε = (2∥zq∥ + ∥e∥)∥V ∥2∥e∥, (4.36)
which yields that ε→ 0 when ∥e∥→ 0.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C.3.
4.3 Computational Approaches
Although the equivalent problems (4.32) and (4.33) are linear optimization
problems over convex constraint sets, they are difficult to solve numeri-
cally since the cones of completely positive and copositive matrices are not
tractable if n > 4. However, for n > 4, we can approximate the solution with
any desired error rate at the expense of computational complexity by using
existing computational tools developed in the optimization community over
the course of time, e.g., [95–100]. Furthermore, each new development in this
active research area (due to its broad applications) will bring in new com-
putational tools and insights to address the problem. Indeed, as remarked
below, the signaling framework could also bring in new insights to copositive
programs.
Remark. In general, optimization over completely positive matrices is a refor-
mulation of some nonconvex quadratic program and correspondingly factor-
ization of its solution is of main interest in order to identify the corresponding
optimal minimizer for the original problem. However factorization of a given
completely positive matrix is also challenging. However, the knowledge of
its CP-rank can play an important role in the computational approaches for
factorization, e.g., as in [93]. However, in [103], the authors have posted the
computation of the CP-rank of a given matrix as one of the open problems in
the theory of completely positive matrices. There exists known upper bounds
on CP-rank of a matrix, e.g., see [104, Theorem 4.1], and in [93], the authors
have exploited these bounds to factorize a given completely positive matrix.
On the other hand, given a solution of the primal problem Ξ∗ = B∗B
′
∗,
where B∗ ∈ Rn×k+ , we can set the size of the signaling space for the corre-
sponding optimal signaling strategy as k. The revelation principle, however,
yields that we can set the size of the signal space as k = n without loss
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of generality, as shown in Proposition 4 of the web appendix of [15]. This
yields that in the primal problem (4.32), there always exists a solution whose
CP-rank is less than or equal to n. Its generalization to the general class of
copositive programs could be an interesting future research direction since
this could lead to new computational tools that search for a solution over
a substantially smaller space. Note that the known bounds on CP-rank are
polynomial in n.
We can approximate CPn through polyhedral cones [95, 98, 99] from in-
side and outside of CPn such that their (nested) sequence converges to CPn
asymptotically. For each polyhedral approximation, the corresponding opti-
mization problem becomes an LP, which can be solved in polynomial time. A
comparison between inner and outer approximations quantifies the accuracy
of the approximation. Furthermore, we can be strategic while approximat-
ing the underlying cone since the main objective is to solve the optimiza-
tion problem rather than approximating the cone everywhere. For example,
in [95], the authors have proposed a fast algorithm to approximate the cone of
copositive matrices “adaptively” via inner and outer polyhedral constraints.
A distinctive feature of this algorithm is to adapt the quality of approxima-
tion according to the optimization objective. In other words, the adaptive
algorithm seeks to attain fine approximation around some neighborhood of
the solution of the optimization problem while letting the approximation be
coarse anywhere else.
4.3.1 Polyhedral Inner and Outer Approximations
Note that the extreme rays of CPn have rank 1, i.e., they can be written
as bb′, where b ∈ Rn+ [91]. Correspondingly, CPn can be viewed as the conic
hull of vectors from the unit simplex ∆n−1 in Rn [99]. Consider a family of





∆i and int{∆i} ∩ int{∆j} = ∅ if i ≠ j.
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where VP denotes the set of vertices in P. In [95], the authors have shown that
IP ⊆ CP
n
⊆ OP for any P. Let CP(K) denote the solution of the following
K-cone program:
CP(K) = min Tr{ΞV̄ } (4.39)
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
Ξ ∈ K.
Since IP ⊆ CP
n
⊆ OP , we have
CP(IP) ≥ CP(CP
n
) ≥ CP(OP). (4.40)
Correspondingly, through a sequence of simplical partitions, we can construct
a sequence of nested polyhedral cones I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ . . . and O1 ⊇ O2 ⊇ . . . that










from below and above, respectively [95].
4.3.2 Resemblance to the Equivalent Problem Formulated
in [15]
We can view a polyhedral inner approximation of CPn, e.g., via the conic hull
of the vertices of the simplical partition of the unit simplex, as a discretization
of the feasible set of the optimization problem through a discretization of the
unit simplex [99]. Correspondingly, based on (4.37), the upper bound in
7The subscripts b and c denote the index of the associated vectors.
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bλb = po, (4.43)
where cb ∶= Tr{bb
′V̄ }.
Note that, in [15, Corollary 1], the authors have shown that the problem





pτ(dp) = po, (4.44)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, ĉS(p) denotes PS’s cost for a given
common belief p ∈ ∆(Z), the constraint ∫∆(Z) pτ(dp) = po is called the Bayes
plausibility, and τ could be viewed as a probability measure over the pos-
terior distributions. The resemblance between (4.44) and (4.43) is notable.
Particularly, a discretization of the simplex ∆(Z) in (4.44) would have lead
to (4.43).
4.3.3 Relaxed Specifications and Sender-Favorite Discrete
Distributions
Recall that the Gaussian distribution leads to the least possible cost for
the sender when the correlation matrix of the underlying random vector
is fixed. Similarly, within the proposed framework, we can relax certain
specifications on the prior distribution to find out the corresponding most
favorable distribution for the sender. For example, an interesting relaxation
would be to consider the scenarios where only the mean of the underlying
prior distribution is fixed, i.e., ZΞ1 = µ
o
∈ R2m. Corresponding equivalent




































Table 4.1: Joint distributions in Scenario I.
Scenario I.
Evidence Suggests
(G) x = −1 (NG) x = 1
Prosecutor
Thinks (G) y = −1 0.3 0.7
Table 4.2: Joint distributions in Scenario II.
Scenario II.
Evidence Suggests
(G) x = −1 (NG) x = 1
Prosecutor
Thinks
(NG) y = 1 0.1 0.4
(G) y = −1 0.2 0.3
Table 4.3: Joint distributions in Scenario III.
Scenario III.
Evidence Suggests
(G) x = −1 (I) x = 0 (NG) x = 1
Prosecutor
Thinks
(NG) y = 1 0.05 0.05 0.1
(I) y = 0 0.05 0.15 0.1
(G) y = −1 0.2 0.2 0.1
where we have 2m + 1 linear constraints different from the primal problem,
where there are n linear constraints. We can enrich the class of problems
that can be formulated within the proposed framework by considering partial
specifications of the underlying distribution or its mean.
4.4 Illustrative Examples
Similar to the example introduced in [15], let us consider the interaction
between a prosecutor (PS) and a judge (PR) during the trial of a defendant.
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Figure 4.2: Computation of the minimum cost for PS in deceptive signaling
game via sequential inner and outer polyhedral approximations in Scenario
I.
Particularly, now the prosecutor has access to
 the information of interest x ∈ X corresponding to the status of a de-
fendant based on some evidence
 the private information y ∈ Y corresponding to the prosecutor’s intu-
ition about the status of the defendant
Irrespective of the evidence, our self-confident and righteous prosecutor seeks
to induce the judge to perceive the status of the defendant in line with his
intuition. On the other side, the judge is only interested in what the evidence
says about the status of the defendant. We consider three scenarios where
the underlying joint distributions over the prosecutor’s intuition and what
the evidence suggests about the defendant’s status are as tabulated in Tables
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, where (NG), (I), and (G) correspond to the status of ‘not
guilty’, ‘innocent’, and ‘guilty’, respectively.
Note that in Scenario I, the prosecutor’s intuition always says that the
defendant is guilty, which can also be viewed as the prosecutor always seeks
for conviction similar to the example studied in [15]. However, this differs
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Figure 4.3: Computation of the minimum cost for PS in deceptive signaling
game via sequential inner and outer polyhedral approximations in Scenario
II.
from the example in [15] in terms of the cost measures, and therefore also
the result is different. The cost of PS when PR has the belief [1 − µ µ]
′
,
where µ ∶= Pz = [−1 −1]
′
, is given by
ĉ(µ) = 4µ2 − 8µ + 3, (4.46)
which is a convex function. Note that even though Tr{V̄ pp′} is a non-convex
function of p, it turns out to be a convex function over the unit simplex under
the specific settings of this example. However, as observed in the following
examples, this is not always the case. Furthermore, as characterized in [15],
since ĉ(⋅) is a convex function, null signaling is the optimal one in Scenario
I. Alternatively, we have its convex envelope C(µ) = ĉ(µ) and the minimum




On the other hand, in Scenarios II and III, the associated cost of PS for
a given posterior belief of PR does not end up to be a convex function. The
dimensions of freedom to select the posterior are 3 and 8, respectively, in Sce-
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Figure 4.4: Computation of the minimum cost for PS in deceptive signaling
game via sequential inner and outer polyhedral approximations in Scenario
III.
Table 4.4: Cost of PS in deceptive signaling game for Scenarios I-III.
Scenarios I II III
Size of State Space 2 4 9




} 0.96 0.16 0
Full Signaling Tr{V̄ diag{p
o
}} 1.8 0.6 0.3
Optimal Signaling Tr{V̄ Ξ∗} 0.96 -0.4715 -0.4283
SDP-Relaxation 0.96 -0.4715 -0.4283
narios II and III. Therefore, in order to apply the same solution concept, we
need to compute the convex envelope of some non-convex functions defined
over R3 and R8, instead of R as we do in Scenario I. However, through the
proposed framework, we can efficiently compute the minimum cost for PS
and the associated optimal signaling strategies in those scenarios. In Table
4.4, we tabulate the results. Proposition 4.3 says that the SDP-relaxation
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Table 4.5: Cost of PS in persuasive privacy game for Scenarios I-III. Note
that V̄ p = Z ′V pZ.
Scenarios I II III
Size of State Space 2 4 9




} 0.84 -0.16 0.09
Full Signaling Tr{V̄ pdiag{p
o
}} 0 0 0.1
Optimal Signaling Tr{V̄ pΞ∗} 0 -0.9583 -0.4707
SDP-Relaxation 0 -0.9583 -0.4707
and the primal problem are equivalent for n ≤ 4, as also seen in Table 4.4. We
also note that the SDP-relaxation has turned out to be a tight lower bound
in Scenario III, where n = 9. In Figs. 4.2-4.4, we illustrate the convergence
behavior of the solutions of the inner and outer polyhedral approximations
across the iterations. Note that with the increase of the size of the state space,
the corresponding number of iterations necessary for convergence increase
significantly while the computational complexity of each iteration increases
further with an increase in the size of the state space.
We have also analyzed the cost of PS in the persuasive privacy game over
Scenarios I-III. We have tabulated the results in Table 4.5. Similar to the case
in the deceptive signaling game, we can apply the solution process introduced
in [15] to this problem for Scenario I. Correspondingly, the cost of PS when
PR has the belief [1 − µ µ]
′
, where µ ∶= Pz = [−1 −1]
′
, is now given by
ĉ(µ) = −4µ2 + 4µ, (4.47)
which is a concave function. As characterized in [15], since ĉ(⋅) is a concave
function, we can conclude that full signaling is the optimal one in Scenario I.
Alternatively, a geometrical inspection yields that the convex envelope of ĉ(µ)
is given by C(µ) = 0, which coincides with the cost for the full signaling case
as expected. We also note that the number of iterations for the convergence
of inner and outer approximations are observed to be similar with the cases
in the deceptive signaling game.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
We have addressed the problem of optimal hierarchical signaling between a
sender and a receiver for a general class of square integrable multivariate
distributions, which has applications to deception and privacy. We have
considered a noncooperative communication setting where the sender and
the receiver have different cost measures. This leads to the possibility of
strategic crafting of the messages sent by the sender. The sender has had
access to the information of interest and some private information, both of
them being realizations of random vectors with arbitrary distributions. We
have shown that the proposed solution concept can compute the minimum
cost for the sender in the deception and privacy applications. For the former
one, the sender seeks to induce the receiver to perceive the information of
interest as the private information. In the latter one, the sender seeks to
minimize the informational leakage of the private information while sharing
the information of interest with the receiver.
For discrete distributions, we have formulated an equivalent linear opti-
mization problem over the cone of completely positive matrices. This has
brought the hierarchical signaling problem into the framework of copositive
programs so that we could use the existing computational tools that can
solve it to any level of accuracy. For continuous distributions, we have also
addressed the approximation error of the minimum cost for the sender if we
have employed the solution concept for its discretized version obtained via
a quantization scheme. Finally we have analyzed the performance of the
proposed solution concept over various numerical examples.
In addition to developing efficient computational tools to address the equiv-
alent cone program, some other future directions of research include: formu-
lation of optimal hierarchical signaling in dynamic and/or noisy environments
with multiple senders and/or multiple receivers, and applications of the set-




Nothing is more common on earth than to deceive and be deceived.
– Johann G. Seume
We have sought to introduce strategic information transmission to cyber-
physical systems as a deception-as-defense mode of operation. We have se-
lected the deception models where the informed agent commits to his/her
strategies beforehand in order to avoid obscurity based strategies that can
become vulnerable once the uninformed agent becomes aware of the strat-
egy. With a specific focus on Gaussian distributions due to their versatility
in engineering applications, we have sought to formulate the optimal signal-
ing strategies in dynamic environments. For Gauss-Markov information, we
have analyzed how a deceptive information provider can shape the shared
information in order to control a decision maker’s decisions in dynamic com-
munication settings. We note that the problem involved two nested infinite-
dimensional optimization problems. For quadratic objective functions over
a finite horizon, we have formulated an equivalent SDP problem enabling
tractable analysis compared to direct optimization over those infinite dimen-
sional strategy spaces. We have shown that linear sender and receiver strate-
gies can yield the equilibrium within the general class of Borel-measurable
policies in strategic communication.
The formulation of optimal signaling strategies for Gauss-Markov infor-
mation in dynamic environments has brought in the possibility of adopting
strategic signaling also in dynamic control systems as deception-as-defense
mode of operation. We have introduced robust sensor design framework as
a security measure in stochastic control systems to provide resiliency against
multiple attackers with misaligned control objectives. We have specifically
considered LQG control systems, where the controller could have been com-
promised by various types of attackers with certain adversarial control ob-
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jectives. We have designed the linear sensor outputs cautiously by taking
the possibility of undetected attacks into consideration. We have provided
an SDP-based algorithm to compute the robust sensor outputs that lead to
minimum damage in terms of system’s quadratic control objective.
Although we could have obtained well structured, e.g., linear, signaling
strategies for Gaussian information, formulation of optimal signaling strate-
gies for a general class of distributions is more involved and less likely to yield
such elegant structures in general. The earlier literature has only addressed it
for a special class of problems and for discrete distributions with fairly small
state spaces. Therefore, we have sought to formulate the persuasion capacity
of a sender for a general class of multivariate square integrable distributions.
Again, instead of a direct approach based on the strategy spaces, we have
formulated an equivalent linear optimization problem over the cone of com-
pletely positive matrices for finite state spaces. In that way, we could apply
the existing computational tools developed in the optimization community to
solve such a class of problems. The ability to compute the persuasion capacity
of discrete distributions with large state spaces has brought in the possibility
of computing the persuasion capacity approximately for continuous distri-
butions. We have also provided guarantees on the level of approximation of
such approaches.
Based on these results, there are various directions for future research in-
cluding their generalizations to signaling problems over networks of multiple
senders and/or receivers, and with uncertainties such as noisy measurements,
noisy channels, unknown cost measures, and unknown state dynamics. More




TECHNICAL RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1














Note that the posterior covariances H1, . . . ,Hn depend on the signaling rules
η1, . . . , ηn, and they are real and symmetric matrices by definition. Next, we
aim to find necessary conditions on Hk’s to derive a tight lower bound on
(2.13). To this end, consider the following positive semi-definite matrix:
E{(xk − x̂k)(xk − x̂k)′} = Σk −Hk ⪰ O,
which implies Σk ⪰ Hk, for k = 1, . . . , n. Furthermore, after some algebra, it
can be shown that
E{(x̂k −E{xk∣y1∶k−1})(x̂k −E{xk∣y1∶k−1})′} =Hk −AHk−1A′, (A.2)
and therefore Hk −AHk−1A′ ⪰ O and correspondingly Hk ⪰ AHk−1A′.
The posterior covariances H1, . . . ,Hk are real, symmetric matrices and
should at least satisfy the constraints: Σ1 ⪰H1 ⪰ O, and Σk ⪰Hk ⪰ AHk−1A′,
for k = 2, . . . , n. Based on this, we can formulate another optimization prob-
lem (2.16) in which the optimization arguments S1, . . . , Sn ∈ Sp are subject
to the constraints in (2.16). Since we have shown that those constraints are
necessary (not necessarily sufficient yet), the minimization problem (2.16) is
a lower bound on (2.13). By the linear objective function ∑k Tr{VkSk} and
the semi-definiteness constraints on Sk, (2.16) is an SDP problem.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Suppose that E = (E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ is an extreme point of Ψ and there exists
an element Ek such that Ek is not an extreme point of Φk(E−k). Then, there
exist two distinct M,N ∈ Φk(E−k) such that Ek = tM + (1 − t)N, for some
t ∈ (0,1). Note that since M,N ∈ Φk(E−k), the matrices M and N satisfy
A−1Ek+1(A
′)−1 ⪰M ⪰ AEk−1A
′,
A−1Ek+1(A
′)−1 ⪰ N ⪰ AEk−1A
′
by (2.19). Therefore,
EM ∶= (E1, . . . ,Ek−1,M,Ek+1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ,
EN ∶= (E1, . . . ,Ek−1,N,Ek+1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ,
and EM ≠ EN since M ≠ N . However, we can write the extreme point E as
E = tEM + (1 − t)EN , for some t ∈ (0,1) even though EM ,EN ∈ Ψ, and this
leads to a contradiction. Hence, if (E1, . . . ,En) ∈ Ψ is an extreme point, the
elements Ek are the extreme points of the corresponding sub-constraint sets
Φk(E−k).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Note that eigenvalues of a symmetric idempotent matrix are either 0 or 1,
and suppose that for a symmetric idempotent matrix P ∈ Φ, there exist two
distinct symmetric matrices M ∈ Φ and N ∈ Φ such that P = tM + (1 − t)N
for some t ∈ (0,1). Let p1, p0 ∈ Rp be eigenvectors of P corresponding to
eigenvalues 1 and 0, respectively. Note that since the eigenvalues of M and
N are bounded, for any vector p ∈ Rp, 0 ≤ p′Mp ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p′Np ≤ 1. Then,
through convex combination, we have










which leads to p′1Mp1 = p
′




0Np0 = 0. Therefore, p1 and
p0 are eigenvectors of M and N . Furthermore, the eigenvalues of M and N
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corresponding to the eigenvectors p1 and p0 are 1 and 0, respectively. Since
p1 and p0 are arbitrary eigenvectors of P , the matrices M and N have the
same eigenvalues and eigenvectors with P , and correspondingly P =M = N ,
which, however, yields a contradiction. In view of these contradictions, we
can say that a symmetric idempotent matrix is an extreme point of Φ.
Lastly, we aim to show that any other matrix which is not an idempotent
matrix, say Z, cannot be an extreme point of Φ. Let Z have an eigen decom-
position Z = Qdiag(λ1, . . . , λp)Q′. Since Z is not an idempotent matrix, there
exists an eigenvalue, say λi, which is neither 1 nor 0. Then, for any t ∈ (0,1),
there exist two distinct λi,1, λi,2 ∈ [0,1] such that λi = tλi,1 + (1 − t)λi,2, e.g.,
set λi,1 = λi/t and λi,2 = 0. Correspondingly, for the matrices
M ∶= Qdiag(. . . , λi,1, . . .)Q
′ and N ∶= Qdiag(. . . , λi,2, . . .)Q
′,
we have Z = tM + (1 − t)N , yet M ≠ N , i.e., Z is not an extreme point of Φ.
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and {Q̃ωk} is given by the discrete-time dynamic Riccati equation







and Q̃ωκ+1 = Qω.
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B.2 Computation of V1∶κ(ω) and vo
Let ωo ∈ Ω denote the type of the benign controller, who has the same objec-

























































































in terms of the augmented vectors u,xo ∈ Rmκ. Correspondingly, the optimal
attack is u∗ = −Φ(ω)−1K(ω)x̂o, where x̂o ∶= [E{xoκ∣s1∶κ}′ ⋯ E{xo1∣s1}′]
′
, for




o − T (ω)x̂o∥∆(ωo) +∆
ωo
0 , (B.6)
where T (ω) ∶= Φ(ωo)Φ(ω)−1K(ω). We introduce













































Note that vo ∈ R does not depend on the types of the controllers. Then, (B.6)
can be written as
∑
ω∈Ω














Hκ AHκ−1 ⋯ Aκ−1H1
Hκ−1A′ Hκ−1 Aκ−2H1
⋮ ⋱ ⋮













Therefore, the corresponding Vk(ω) ∈ Sm in (3.23) is given by





l−k + (Al−k)′Ξl,k(ω), (B.11)
where Ξk,l(ω) ∈ Rm×m is an m ×m block of Ξ(ω), with indexing from the
right-bottom to the left-top.
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TECHNICAL RESULTS IN CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Claim C.1. For any signaling rule π ∈ Π, Ξπ ∈ Sn satisfies Ξπ ∈ CPn and
Ξπ1 = po, where po ∶= [po(z1) . . . po(zn)]
′
.


























which is clearly a non-negative matrix since all the entries are products of
(non-negative) probability measures. This yields that Ξπ ∈ CP
n.
For a given signaling rule π ∈ Π, let So ⊆ S denote the set of signals that
PS sends with positive probability, i.e., p(s) > 0 for all s ∈ So. Then, the sum





























where (a) follows from (4.17) and (4.18), (b) follows from (4.17), and (c)
follows from (4.16). By (C.5), we have Ξπ1 = po, which completes the proof
of the claim.
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Claim C.2. For any completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn that satisfies Ξ1 =
p
o
, there exists a signaling rule π ∈ Π such that Ξπ = Ξ, where Ξπ ∈ CP
n is as
described in (4.22).
Proof. Consider any completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn that satisfies Ξ1 =
p
o
. By the definition of completely positive matrices, we can decompose
Ξ ∈ CPn into Ξ = BB′, where
B = [b1 . . . bk] ∈ R
n×k
+ (C.6)
is some non-negative matrix. We note that the decomposition is not neces-
sarily a unique one [91]. For example, by padding zero columns into B, we
can generate infinitely many decompositions. Correspondingly, we assume,
without loss of generality, that in the decomposition of Ξ ∈ CPn, the non-
negative matrix B ∈ Rn×k+ does not have an all zero column, i.e., bi ≠ 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , k.
Recall that for any given signaling rule π ∈ Π, we can decompose Ξπ = AA′,
where the matrix A ∈ Rn×∣S ∣+ is as described in (C.1). Correspondingly, if we
can show that there exists a signaling rule π ∈ Π such that A = B, then this
would imply that Ξ = Ξπ for that signaling rule. To this end, we let ∣S ∣ = k,
and introduce auxiliary vectors
πi ∶= [π(si∣z1) . . . π(si∣zn)]
′
, (C.7)
which, by (4.18), yields that p(si) = π′ipo. Therefore, by substituting (4.17)
in (C.1), we can write the matrix A as










where Po ∶= diag{po}, which is nonsingular since the prior distribution po has





= bi, ∀i = 1, . . . , k, (C.9)







However, we also need to inspect the validity of (C.10) as a signaling rule.
Particularly, we have the constraints on the signaling strategies that π(s∣z) ≥
0 for all s ∈ S and z ∈ Z, and (4.16).1 The former constraint is satisfied
by the definition, since bi is a column of the non-negative matrix B ∈ Rn×k+ .
Verification of the latter constraint (4.16) is relatively more involved. To this
end, let us introduce
Π ∶= [π1 . . . πk] . (C.11)
Then, the latter constraint is equivalent to Π1 = 1, i.e., the sum of columns
of Π is an all 1s vector. If we set πi as in (C.10), then we would obtain
Π = [(b′11)P
−1




o bn] , (C.12)
and correspondingly the sum of columns of Π is given by















i1 is just a scalar.
Recall that the completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn satisfies Ξ1 = p
o
, which









i1 = po. (C.14)
Therefore, by (C.13) and (C.14), we obtain Π1 = P −1o po = 1, and correspond-
ingly (C.10) is a valid signaling strategy, which completes the proof of the
claim.
Based on (4.23), Claims C.1 and C.2 yield (4.29), and (4.26) follows from
(C.10), which completes the proof.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.4
The primal problem is feasible since the constraint set is not empty based on
Claims C.1 and C.2.
1Note that if both of these constraints hold, this would also imply that π(s∣z) ∈ [0,1]
for all s ∈ S and z ∈ Z.
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The fact that the primal problem has finite value follows by the extreme
value theorem since the optimization objective is linear in the optimization
argument and the constraint set
{Ξ ∈ CPn∣Ξ1 = p
o
} (C.15)
is a closed and bounded subset of CPn.
It is relatively more involved to show that the primal problem entails an
interior point. Particularly, a characterization of the interior of CPn is given
by [102, Theorem 3.3]
int{CPn} = {AA′ ∣ rankA = n,A = [a Ã]
∋ a > 0, Ã ≥ 0}. (C.16)




Based on Claims C.1 and C.2, let us consider the associated signaling
problem where we set the signal space as S = {so = ∅, s1 = z1, . . . , sn =
zn}, and the prior distribution over Z to have full support, without loss of
generality. Consider the two extreme cases: full disclosure and null disclosure,
respectively, given and denoted by π(zi) = zi, and π(zi) = ∅ for all i =
1, . . . , n. Note that for a given signaling strategy π ∈ Π, an entry of the
associated completely positive matrix Ξπ is described in (4.22). Furthermore,




∋ A ∶= [0 Po] , (C.17)
Ξπ = AA
′
∋ A ∶= [p
o
O] . (C.18)
This yields that if PS selects a signaling strategy π ∈ Π that discloses z ∈ Z
truthfully, i.e., si = zi, with probability λ ∈ (0,1) and discloses so otherwise,
then we obtain
Ξπ = AA
′ ∋ A ∶= [(1 − λ)p
o
λPo] , (C.19)
in which the first column is a positive vector and rankA = n since po is an
all-positive vector, i.e., the prior distribution has full support over Z by the
formulation. This yields that Ξπ ∈ int{CP
n
} and Ξπ1 = po.
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Since the conditions for the strong duality theorem [105, Theorem 4.7.1]
hold, we have strong duality between the primal and dual problems, which
concludes the proof.
C.3 Proof of Corollary 4.5
We first note that the following inequality always holds
min
s
Tr{E{ẑẑ ′}V } ≤ min
s
Tr{E{ẑqẑ ′q}V } (C.20)
since any quantization would restrict PS’s strategy space for continuous dis-
tributions.
Let ê = ẑ − ẑq for a given signal s, i.e., ê = E{e∣s}. Then, for any signal
s ∼ Z, we have









Tr{(E{ẑqê′} +E{êẑ ′q} +E{êê′})V } . (C.21)
Let us take a closer look at the second term on the right-hand side, which
can also be written as
−max
s
−Tr{(E{ẑqê′} +E{êẑ ′q} +E{êê′})V } . (C.22)
Then, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for random vectors yields that (C.22)
is bounded from above by
−2E{ẑ ′qV ê} −E{ê′V ê} ≤ (2∥ẑq∥ + ∥ê∥)∥V ∥2∥ê∥,
since ∥ − V ∥2 = ∥V ∥2. Note that the right-hand side depends on the signal s.
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2 ≥ 0, (C.23)
∥e − ê∥2 = ∥e∥2 − ∥ê∥2 ≥ 0. (C.24)
Therefore, by (C.23) and (C.24), we obtain
−2E{ẑ ′qV ê} −E{ê′V ê} ≤ (2∥zq∥ + ∥e∥)∥V ∥2∥e∥, (C.25)




Tr{E{ẑqẑ ′q}V } −mins Tr{E{ẑẑ
′}V } ≥ 0,
where ε is as described in (4.36), which completes the proof.
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[37] M. O. Sayin and T. Başar, “Deceptive multi-dimensional information
disclosure over a Gaussian channel,” in Proceedings of the American
Control Conference (ACC), 2018, pp. 6545–6552.
120
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